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KING

Knowledge for INtegration Governance

Economic or Cultural Threat? Orientations towards immigration and European integration among EU citizens and national parties over time

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KING Project – Political Science Unit
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KING - Knowledge for INtegration Governance

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The KING project's objective is to elaborate a report on the **state of play** of migrant integration in Europe through an interdisciplinary approach and to provide decision- and policy-makers with **evidence-based recommendations** on the design of migrant integration-related policies and on the way they should be articulated between different policy-making levels of governance.

Migrant integration is a truly multi-faceted process. The contribution of the insights offered by different disciplines is thus essential in order better to grasp the various aspects of the presence of migrants in European societies. This is why **multidisciplinarity** is at the core of the KING research project, whose Advisory Board comprises experts of seven different disciplines:
EU Policy – Yves Pascouau
Political Science - Alberto Martinelli
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Demography – Gian Carlo Blangiardo

The project consists in the conduct of preliminary **Desk Research** to be followed by an empirical in-depth analysis of specific key topics identified within the desk research. To carry out these two tasks, each Advisory Board member chose and coordinated a team of two to five researchers, who have been assigned a range of topics to cover.
The present paper belongs to the series of contributions produced by the researchers of the "Political Science" team directed by Professor Alberto Martinelli:

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Public Administration		
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Economics		
Demography		

The project is coordinated by the **ISMU Foundation**, based in Milan (Italy).

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Economic or Cultural Threat? Orientations towards immigration and European integration among EU citizens and national parties over time

INTRODUCTION

The recent Lampedusa tragic events have brought the attention once again to the fact that addressing immigration issues is critical for the future development of the European Union project. During the last decades, immigration became increasingly salient for the entire European Union. The net number of immigrants has kept growing for years (Figure 1). Even today, although the global economic crisis drastically reduced job opportunities and the well-being of European societies, immigration from less developed countries has not stopped, sometimes at the price of hundreds of lives of people trying to reach EU boundaries in search of a better life.

For many years, extra-EU immigrants have represented a resource that has failed to be appreciated by EU citizens. Extra-EU immigrants granted European plants and enterprises with low-cost labour, thus allowing Europe to grow at lower costs. Moreover, as figure 1.2 efficaciously shows, starting from 1991, immigrants reduced the drastic decline in EU population compensating for births reduction. Although immigration has not been given a proper place in European development, for long time it has not been demonized either. It simply has not been a much politicized issue.

Figure 1 - Natural population change and net migration EU27, 1961-2011 (in million)



Source: Eurostat, Allians SE Group Economic Research and Corporate Development (in Grimm, 2012)

In the last decade, however, something has changed: populist and xenophobic parties acquired a larger electorate all around Europe, making use of sentiments of fear against immigration due to differences in culture, lifestyle and habits. This growing xenophobic trend was sustained by two important events, which permanently marked the last 15 years: the 2001 twin towers terroristic attack and the 2007-2008 global economic crisis. Those episodes represented significant ruptures in the framing of immigration issues: after 2001, in fact, immigration became mainly a cultural defy and immigrants were often perceived as dangerous challengers of unadulterated national traditions. The 2008 global economic crisis made the situation worse: in addition to the cultural threat, job scarcity compelled EU citizens to compete with immigrants for jobs that were once left to them. This complex situation calls for a necessary careful reflection on how citizens and parties frame the multifaceted issue of immigration. For policy measures to be effective, immigration and integration issues need to be addressed and managed with a united effort of all European countries. Understanding the public discourse in European countries is crucial because it can legitimize (or not) policy choices and in the long term this can affect also the legitimacy and endurance of the European integration project.

In this paper we analyse the immigration issue at three levels: macro, meso and micro. At the macro level, i.e. at the country level, we give a picture of the contextual situation by looking at levels of immigration and integration, as well as at economic and political contexts. At the meso level, we analyse parties and European Parliamentary families' orientation toward immigration, looking at whether parties are also more or less critical towards the European Union. At the micro level, we analyse individual and contextual determinants of orientations toward immigration as well as investigating whether these are likely to feed Euroscepticism attitudes. We conclude by giving some directions on what general dimension policy on immigration and integration should focus on.

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Over the last decades, there has been an increase in negative attitudes towards immigration both among citizens and among political parties. Right-wing political parties with strong xenophobic or anti-immigrant positions have appeared and gained terrain in many European countries (Ignazi, 2003; Golder, 2003). Plenty of research has also been undertaken to understand what determines increasing anti-immigration attitudes. This increase in negative attitudes is likely due, at least partially, to growing flows of immigration from poorer countries within the EU, that has obliged citizens and political parties to deal with a new challenge, both in economic and cultural terms. In order to be able to address the immigration phenomenon appropriately, it is important to understand how immigration is received by society. Public opinion and public discourse on immigration is therefore crucial both to understand what the feelings of society is at present, up to which point immigration can be accepted by the majority of citizens, and what are the conditions that favours acceptance. As national and European institutions are making an effort towards a harmonization of immigration and asylum policies at the European Union level, aiming at the same time to find the best model for integration, public opinion can be crucial in facilitating or obstructing the acceptance of these policies (Lahav, 2004). This is why, before deciding in which direction immigration and integration policies should go, it is critical to inform decisions by studying what determines feeling of anti-immigration, and how these are connected to the political offer of a particular country and to other macro-level characteristics.

Are immigrants perceived as a resource or as a threat by the population? What kind of people tend to have more negative opinions towards immigrants? What kind of consequences these people fear? Individual level determinants such as education, gender, employment status, income, political orientation, political interest and other have been reported as positively or negatively affecting attitudes towards immigration

(see for instance Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). More interestingly, however, previous research has developed a categorization that accounts for the type of source of individual level anti-immigrant attitudes. According to these studies anti-immigrant sentiments should be originated either by material/economic interest or by national/cultural identity (e.g., Citrin *et al.*, 1997; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Lahav, 2004). Both are based on the perception that immigrants are a threat to the material world of the respondents in the former case, and to their symbolic world in the latter case. In short, literature shows that citizens' fear of immigrants is originated by the fact that they are either "taking their job" or "taking their country".

Relevant studies have established that, among low-skilled or manual workers, there are realistic fears about the economic effects of job competitions with immigrants. They have the perceptions that immigrants take the jobs that otherwise would go to them (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Borjas, 1999; Gang *et al.*, 2002; Citrin *et al.*, 1997; Sides and Citrin, 2007). These studies do not focus on the actual economic conditions of a country, but rather on the *perception of an economic threat* to individuals or to the country, which is thought to be what matters the most in generating attitudes towards immigration.

However, other studies have reported how the fear of immigration and consequent negative feelings towards it does not come by labour-market competition. It is rather originated by a cultural conflict between the "natives" and the new comers. Material concerns are not central. A stronger role is given to values such as ideology, beliefs and long-standing national attachments in stimulating anti-immigration attitudes, which would favour "out-group bias" (Sears, 1996; Tajfel, 1982). Individuals with stronger attachment to their country and with stronger national pride are therefore more likely to see immigrants as a cultural threat to their nation (Sides and Citrin, 2007). *Political ideology* and *orientation*, in this sense, play a crucial role. Although left and right orientation might still be influenced by a politicization of immigration in terms of economic threat, it is usually assumed that people that self-place themselves on the right side of the political spectrum are more likely to be more attached to values such as traditionalism, authority and nationalism (*tan*) and therefore are more likely to have negative attitudes towards immigration. On the other hand, those that self-place themselves on the left side of the political spectrum are more likely to be more attached to values of tolerance and respect for other cultures (*gal*) (Brug, Fennema and Tillie, 2000; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007).

Which interpretation better describes the nature of anti-immigrant sentiments? The answer to this question is critical to understand how society reacts to such a big and challenging phenomenon and provides better instruments to policy makers to make accurate and appropriate decisions. If anti-immigration attitudes come from an economic and material fear, then policymakers could, for instance, address the phenomenon of immigration through short-term economic actions in the labour-market that targets unskilled workers. This would be likely to reduce their fear of competitions with immigrants. On the other hand, if anti-immigrant attitudes come from a more symbolic and loss of national identity fear, a more systematic and long-term measures should be undertaken, particularly emphasizing the cultural side of them in order to mitigate and prevent a "clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1996).

Moreover, although we know that individual characteristics are crucial to explaining individual orientations towards immigration, specific characteristics of the national context could also affect these sentiments. Characteristics such as the size of the immigration population, as well as the level of integration of immigrants in the country could be crucial in influencing anti-immigration attitudes (Lahav, 2004; McLaren, 2002; Sides and Citrin, 2007). Not only this, but attitudes could also be cued by the political offer which takes strong position on immigration and that affect the national debate on the issue (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Rohrschneider, 2002; Dale and Sabri, 2012). This is why it is also crucial to look at how publics are mobilized and how immigration is politicized within different countries.

Lastly, it is feared that the economic crisis that has been hitting the Eurozone since late 2008 might influence the rise of anti-immigration attitudes. Not only this. Given that support for the European Union is decreasing all over Europe, there are reasons to expect that the increase in anti-immigration attitudes may also feed anti-European attitudes either because of economic or cultural fears. This is particularly relevant because it would undermine any common European effort to address the challenge of immigration.

2. AVAILABLE DATA

In this study we include all countries embraced by the KING project, that is the 27 European Union Member States, plus Croatia that only recently joined the EU: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxemburg, Spain, Sweden, UK, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia. Although our aim is to run our analyses for all of these countries, data availability in different sources determines which country we include in different sections of the paper.

We are in principle interested in studying the evolution of orientations towards immigration held by political parties and citizens throughout the last decade. However, we specifically focus on four time periods, because of their relevance in terms of importance of economic or cultural dimensions in attitudes towards immigrants:

a) **Before and after 2001**: the 2001 twin towers terroristic attack changed the way people look and think of immigration. Before the so called "clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1996), immigrants were simple (but sometime dangerous) economic competitors in the job market. After 2001, immigrants became also cultural enemies (more than they were considered in the past) and dangerous neighbours, challenging the safety and integrity of each own nation.
b) **Before and after 2008**: the economic crisis changed again the image of immigrants. We look at the time-slot just right before the economic and financial crisis that affected most of the Western countries and particularly the weakest areas of the Eurozone, such as Southern European countries. And then at the time period after 2008, in which immigrants are likely to have re-became treacherous contender of scarcer job opportunities together with a threat to the national cultural identity.

According to data availability, for each data source we select years that can be fit in at least one of these four time periods.

We focus our analysis on three different levels and we use data accordingly: a macro level, a meso level and a micro level. The **macro** level refers to the country context characteristics. In particular, we are interested in knowing the levels of immigration in each country (Eurostat and OECD data) and the level of integration of national policies (MIPEX index). Both Eurostat[1] and OECD[2] offer statistical information on immigration levels. MIPEX (Migration Integration Policy Index)[3] is instead an index measuring integration policies within EU countries. The index is constructed by looking at 148 policy indicators, so that it provides a multi-dimensional picture of migrants' opportunities to participate in society by assessing governments' commitment to integration. We are also interested in general country economic indicator, such as unemployment rate (Eurostat).

[1] Eurostat is a Directorate-General of the European Commission that provides statistical information to the institutions of the EU and promotes the harmonization of statistical methods across countries.
[2] The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an international economic organization of thirty four countries founded in 1961 to stimulate economic progress and world trade.
[3] Mipex is led by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) and the Migration Policy Group (MPG). http://www.mipex.eu/

The **meso** level refers to the political party level. In order to study political parties' attitudes on immigration and orientations toward the European Union within specific countries and within specific party families, we use data from two types of expert surveys: for 2002, we use Benoit and Laver's expert survey[4]; for 2006 and 2010, we use Chapel Hill expert surveys[5]. Benoit and Laver's expert survey includes the orientations of 387 political parties in 47 nations regarding a large selection of party attitudes toward economic (e.g. market vs. regulation), social (e.g. abortion, homosexuality, etc.) and political (e.g. media freedom, nationalism, EU role, etc.) matters. The 2006 and 2010 Chapel Hill expert surveys provide the positioning of, respectively, 227 and 237 political parties on an array of party and policy variables such as vote percentage, party family, government and opposition status, left-right position, attitudes toward EU integration, and orientations on a number of issue such as income redistribution, market economy, immigration, religion, environment, etc. It covers all EU member states other than Luxembourg, Cyprus, and Malta.

Finally, the **micro** level refers to the individual level[6]. In order to study citizens' orientations towards immigration and towards the European Union, we look at two different public opinion surveys: Eurobarometer (2003-2013) and European Social Survey (2002; 2008; 2012). First of all, in order to have a quick glance of what percentage of people in different countries, on average (aggregate level), perceive immigration as an important problematic issue, we look at Eurobarometer opinion surveys (EB). The purpose of EB is to monitor the evolution of public opinion in the EU Member States. The 27+1 countries belonging to the European Union are part of the Eurobarometer study and each survey consists of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per country. Then, in order to study the evolution of European anti-immigration attitudes and of its determinants at the individual level, we make use of three rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) that fits into our four time-periods slot: 2002 (1st round), 2008 (4th round), 2012 (5th round). The ESS is an academically driven cross-national survey that has been conducted every two years across Europe since 2001. The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations in more than thirty nations. Twenty EU countries participated in at least one of the three selected ESS rounds. These countries are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Great Britain (GB), Greece (GR) Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Luxembourg (LU), the Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Sweden (SE) and Slovenia (SI). After looking at the way individual perceptions are related to national-level contextual characteristics, we finally look at the aggregate levels of Euroscepticism in different countries and at whether and how anti-immigration orientations helps to feed Eurosceptic feelings.

With the aim of informing our discussion on orientation towards immigration and its relationship with negative attitudes towards the EU, in the following paragraphs we investigate each of the three levels we outlined above: the macro, the meso and the micro level. Before proceeding, however, we build two indexes in three points in time, that will help us analyse the issue of immigration and its connection to euroscepticism at the macro- national level and at the meso-European party family level.

- The *anti-immigration* policy index is constructed as follows:
  - For 2002, we use Benoit and Laver's expert survey[7].
    - Meso level index: Since parties positions on immigration are measured on a scale from 1 to 20, we multiply each party score by the salience that experts attributed to that issue, and then we

[4] Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver (2006) *Party Policy in modern Democracies*, London, Routledge.

[5] Ryan Bakker, Catherine de Vries, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Vachudova. (2012), "Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999-2010" forthcoming in *Party Politics*.

[6] Although in this section of the paper we also use country-average aggregation of individual level data as well as relationship between micro and macro level data, for sake of simplicity we refer to this section as *micro*.

[7] Question wording: "Immigration: Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into ___ society. (1) … Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return to their country of origin. (20)"

divide the result by four, thus obtaining an index of anti-immigration policies for each party on a scale from 0 to 100.
    - Macro level index: We sum each party value weighted by its vote share at last election before survey (making 100 the sum of vote share of each country).
  - For 2006 and 2010, we use Chapel Hill expert survey[8].
    - Meso level index: Since parties positions on immigration are measured on a scale from 0 to 10, we multiply each party score by its respective salience
    - Macro level index: we sum each party value weighted by its vote share at last election before survey (making 100 the sum of vote share of each country).
- The *Euroscepticism* index is constructed as follows:
  - For 2002, we use Benoit and Laver's expert survey[9].
    - Meso level index: Since parties positions on European Union are measured on a scale from 1 to 20, we multiply each party score by the salience that experts attributed to that issue, and then we divide the result by four, thus obtaining an index of anti-immigration policies for each party on a scale from 0 to 100.
    - Macro level index: We sum each party value weighted by its vote share at last election before survey (making 100 the sum of vote share of each country).
  - For 2006 and 2010, we use Chapel Hill expert survey[10].
    - Meso level index: After reversing the scale, we multiply each party score on European Union by its respective salience, then we multiply by one hundred and divide by 28 (the position scale goes, in fact, from 1 to 7, while the salience score goes from 1 to 4), thus obtaining an index of anti-immigration policies for each party on a scale from 0 to 100.
    - Macro level index: After that, we sum each party value weighted by its vote share at last election before survey (making 100 the sum of vote share of each country).

3. MACRO-LEVEL DATA: THE NATIONAL CONTEXT

Place of birth and *nationality* are the two criteria most commonly used to define the "immigrant" population. The *foreign-born population* usually covers all persons who have ever migrated from their country of birth to their current country of residence. The prevalence of such persons can be significant in some countries, in particular in countries who receive large inflows of repatriates from former colonies. On the contrary, the *foreign population* usually consists of persons who still have the nationality of their home country. This means that it may also include persons born in the host country. In general, the *foreign-born* criterion gives substantially higher percentages for the immigrant population than the definition based on *nationality*. This is because many *foreign-born* persons acquire the *nationality* of the host country and no longer appear as foreign nationals. On the contrary, the *foreign population* tends to increase more slowly, because inflows of foreign nationals tend to be counterbalanced by persons acquiring the nationality of the host country (OECD). A comparison of the two criteria, the foreign-born population and the foreign population, is shown for 2010 in Figure 3.1.

[8] Question wording: "Position on immigration policy: 0 = strongly opposes tough policy … 10 strongly favours tough policy".
[9] Question wording: "EU: Authority: Favours increasing the range of areas in which the EU can set policy. (1) … Favours reducing the range of areas in which the EU can set policy. (20)"
[10] Question wording: "Overall orientation of the party leadership toward European integration in 2006/2010: 1 = strongly opposed; 2 = opposed; 3= somewhat opposed; 4 = neutral; 5 = somewhat in favour; 6 = in favour; 7 = strongly in favour".

Figure 3.1 - *Foreign-born* population and *foreign* population in 2010



Source: OECD

We can see that in almost all countries the percentage of foreign born population is higher than the foreign population. However, this is particularly so in countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK, most of which have former colonies overseas. In countries such as Belgium, Sweden and the Netherlands the gap between the two indicators could also be explained by the fact that naturalisation rate is high in these countries[11].

With the purpose of mapping Europe in terms of immigration levels, we need to make choices and to triangulate data. Since international datasets need to rely on national data that might not always be complete or precise, in order to have a better picture of the immigration landscape in EU countries, we initially choose to look at two sources and at two different types of measures, which also allow us overcome missing data or any other potential problems. We decide to use OECD data for *foreign population*, that is of people who still have the nationality of their home country that is different from that of the country in which they reside. However, OECD foreign population does not distinguish between EU and extra-EU immigrants. Since we are interested in looking at attitudes towards immigrants from third countries, we also use Eurostat data for *foreign population* that allows us to consider only extra-EU immigrants.

[11] The OECD website reports the following: "The difference across countries between the size of the *foreign-born population* and that of the *foreign population* depends on the rules governing the acquisition of citizenship in each country. In some countries, children born in the country automatically acquire the citizenship of their country of birth (*jus soli*, the right of soil) while in other countries, they retain the nationality of their parents (*jus sanguinis*, the right of blood). In some others, they retain the nationality of their parents at birth but receive that of the host country at their majority. Differences in the ease with which immigrants may acquire the citizenship of the host country explain part of the gap between the two series".

Figure 3.2 - *Foreign Population* (EU and extra-EU) per country (in thousands)



Source: OECD

Data of immigration of both sources are provided in thousands of people. In order to be able to better compare levels of immigration and to better understand the relative importance of immigration phenomenon within single EU countries, we also provide the percentage of immigrants over the total population. Figure 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate the levels of immigration in each country, both in thousands and in percentage of population. Plotting these levels over four points in time we are also able to look at how immigration has evolved over the last decade in different countries.

Figure 3.3 - *Foreign Population* (EU and extra-EU) per country (in % of population)



Note: in Estonia and Latvia, the proportion of (non-EU) foreign citizens is particularly large due to the high number of 'recognized non-citizens', mainly former Soviet Union citizens, who are permanently resident in these countries but have not acquired Latvian/Estonian citizenship or any other citizenship.
Source: OECD. Foreign population.

The main immigrant receiving countries (from other EU and extra-EU countries) in thousands of people are Germany, France, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom, with over 4000 thousands immigrants in 2012[12]. In terms of percentage over population, however, if we exclude Estonia and Latvia, where the percentage of foreign citizens is particularly large due to the high number of "recognized non-citizens", mainly former Soviet Union citizens, who are permanently resident in these countries but have not acquired Latvian/Estonian citizenship or any other citizenship, the foreign population picture slightly changes. Not only France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK have high immigration, but also Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Sweden and Luxembourg (all over 7% in 2011).

As we can see from Figure 3.3, apart from Estonia, Germany and Lithuania, all the countries included in the graph have seen an increase in their *foreign population* as percentage of population. Southern European countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain have received the highest amount of immigrants in the last decade.

If we look to the extra-EU *foreign population* (Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5), the main immigrant receiving countries (from other extra-EU countries) in thousands of people are still Germany, France, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom, with over 2000 thousands immigrants in 2012. In terms of percentage over population, however, we see that also Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, Sweden have quite high immigration rates (at least 4%).

[12] France has almost 4000 thousands.

Figure 3.4 - *Foreign population* (Extra–EU), EU28 (in thousands)



Source: Eurostat. Foreign population

Figure 3.4 - *Foreign population* (Extra–EU), EU28 (in% of population)



Source: Eurostat. Foreign population

Contrarily to the total of foreign population, the extra-EU immigration increase over the last decade is less generalized: countries with immigration levels as different as Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,

Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden have seen an increase in the percentage of extra-EU foreign population of a sizable amount. Countries such as Austria, Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Ireland, Malta and UK did not changed much their respective percentages of extra-EU *foreign* population, while in Estonia, Germany, Latvia and Netherlands the percentage of extra-EU immigration decreased during the last decade. As Figure 3.5 shows, those trends do not depend on immigration levels: actually, among low immigration countries, as well as among intermediate and high immigration countries, variation is not uniform and all three groups include countries that have seen their immigration level increase, decrease or stabilize.

Despite their different levels of immigration, some European countries have been able to answer better than others to the problems inevitably brought about by the immigration phenomenon. To analyse these differences among EU democracies, we use the MIPEX index. As mentioned, MIPEX measures integration policies within EU countries, providing information on migrants' opportunities to participate in society by assessing governments' commitment to integration. Seven different types of policies have been included to calculate the overall MIPEX index: labour market mobility, family reunion for third country nationals, education, political participation, long term residence, access to nationality and anti-discrimination policies. The MIPEX index ranges from 0 (no integration) to 100 (maximum integration). We classify EU-27 countries in three categories, according to their overall MIPEX score (Table 4.1): we divide the difference between maximum and minimum actual MIPEX score (83-31) by three (that is, 17). Then we calculate the three thirds of it:

- low-MIPEX countries, i.e. those countries with an index up to 48 (the first third: 31+17);
- middle-MIPEX countries, i.e. those countries with an index up to 65 (the second third: 48+17);
- high-MIPEX countries, i.e. those countries with an index equal or more than 66 (the final third).

Table 3.1 - MIPEX integration index 2010

High		**Middle**		**Low**	
Sweden	83	Spain	63	Czech Republic	46
Portugal	79	Italy	60	Estonia	46
Finland	69	Luxembourg	59	Hungary	45
Netherlands	68	Germany	57	Romania	45
Belgium	67	UK	57	Austria	42
		Denmark	53	Poland	42
		France	51	Bulgaria	41
		Greece	49	Lithuania	40
		Ireland	49	Malta	37
		Slovenia	49	Slovakia	36
				Cyprus	35
				Latvia	31

Source: MIPEX 2010

As shown in Table 3.1, five countries have a high MIPEX level (Portugal, Finland, Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden), ten countries an intermediate level (Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, Germany, UK, Demark, France, Greece, Ireland and Slovenia) and the remaining twelve countries have a low MIPEX score.

In order to summarize the macro level picture of immigration and immigrants' integration within EU countries, we construct a 9 cells table, using three levels of immigration in rows and three levels of integration in columns. We divide integration into the three levels described above, while for immigration we classify country according to level of EU and extra-EU foreign population, using OECD data. We categorize countries with more than 7% foreign population as *high* foreign population countries, countries with between 3.5% and 7% foreign population as *intermediate* foreign population countries, and countries with lower than 3.5% foreign population as *low* foreign population countries.

As Table 3.2 shows, all countries with a low level of immigration have also a low MIPEX index. Low integration countries are also Czech Republic, Malta, Austria and Cyprus. The first two countries, however, have an intermediate level of immigration, while Austria and Cyprus do not perform well in integration despite having a high number of immigrants. In an intermediate situation for both integration and immigration are Denmark, France, Greece and Slovenia, while Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and UK have a high percentage of foreign population but an intermediate MIPEX level. Finally, among countries with an intermediate level of immigration, Finland, Netherlands and Portugal reach a high level of integration, while Belgium and Sweden lead the rank of EU27 countries having a high level of both immigration and integration.

Table 3.2 - EU27 countries divided by levels of foreign population and integration (MIPEX)

	High MIPEX	*Intermediate MIPEX*	*Low MIPEX*
High Foreign Population (at least 7%)	Belgium, Sweden	Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, UK	Austria, Cyprus
Intermediate Foreign Population (From 3.5% to 7%)	Finland, Netherlands, Portugal	Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia	Czech Republic, Malta*
Low Foreign Population (lower than 3.5%)			Bulgaria, Estonia**, Hungary, Latvia**, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic

Note: * Malta is included as intermediate immigration country instead of low immigration country because it is a transition country for immigration and it is therefore likely to be more similar in terms of immigration attitudes to intermediate or high immigration countries.
** Estonia and Latvia are considered here as low immigration country, since the high percentages of immigration are not due to genuine immigration but to the high number of 'recognized non-citizens', mainly former Soviet Union citizens, who are permanently resident in these countries but have not acquired Latvian/Estonian citizenship.
Source: OECD (EU and Extra-EU foreign population) and MIPEX index

In order to better visualize EU conditions in terms of immigration and integration we construct a map of EU27 countries (Figure 3.7) according to our 9 cells typology. The map makes immediately evident that East European countries are homogeneous in immigration and integration, having a low levels of both. The rest of the EU is less uniform, revealing that different countries, even if in similar economic and cultural conditions, react to immigration with different integration policies.

Figure 3.7 - EU27 countries divided by levels of immigration and integration (MIPEX)



Source: OECD (EU and extra-EU foreign population and MIPEX)

Finally, a closer look is needed to anti-immigration orientations and euroscepticism. In order to look at their evolutions during the period considered, we use the macro-level indexes mentioned above. In general, we can see that European countries are more xenophobic than eurosceptic. East European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia) and Scandinavian countries (Finland and Sweden) represent an exception. The difference between the two indexes is generally marked, but none of them follows a clear evolution during the last decade. On the contrary, they are often marked by more contingent events: for example, the introduction of the Euro caused a peak of euroscepticism in UK in 2002, while the recent Greek economic crisis made the same in Greece.

Figure 3.8 - EU countries, anti-immigration policy index and euroscepticism index



Source: Benoit and Laver's (2002) and Chapel Hill expert survey (2006, 2010)

4. MESO-LEVEL DATA: PARTIES AND PARTY FAMILIES

After having explored levels of immigration and integration in different countries, along with other macro level characteristics, in this and the next section we analyse the climate of opinion on immigration by looking at meso- and 'micro'-level data. As mentioned above, the micro-level refers to citizens' opinions, while the meso-level indicates the policy position of national parties and of European party families. The two levels are intertwined since a country climate of opinion can be influenced by political parties' preferences, which contribute to form citizens' attitudes toward an issue as politicized as immigration, and an issue such euroscepticism that, with the Eurozone crisis, has also become very politicized. In this section we concentrate only on the meso-level, while in the next section we analyse the micro-level, also exploring how this relate to the national climate of opinion on immigration and euroscepticism.

First of all, we describe how political parties changed their positions on immigration policies from 2002 to 2010. In order to evaluate parties' orientations toward immigration, we use Benoit and Laver and Chapel Hill expert surveys. Secondly, we look inside each European parliamentary group to see if they are more or less homogeneous in term of their policy positions toward immigration and toward European integration. Finally, we give a closer look at the relationship between parties' attitudes toward immigration and euroscepticism controlling for party families. In the *appendix* the complete list of party acronyms used in the figures can be found.

4.1 European parties and their orientation toward immigration policies

In order to appraise the evolution of European parties' position toward immigration, we build an index of each party orientation toward tough immigration policies. For 2002, we use the immigration score found in Benoit and Laver's expert survey (question 19)[13]: we divide parties' scores and their respective importance by 20, we interact the two measures and we then multiply the results by one hundred, so to have a percentage measure. For 2006 and 2010, we obtain a percentage index using the immigration score found in 2006 and 2010 Chapel Hill expert surveys[14] (question 25). We divide parties' scores and their respective salience by 10, interacting the two measures and then multiplying the results by one hundred.

To analyse the development of parties' positions toward immigration in the last decade, we consider groups of countries based on our typology of level of immigration (*foreign population*, OECD data) vs. MIPEX index. Starting with countries with ***high immigration*** and *high MIPEX*, i.e. Belgium and Sweden, we can notice a quite dissimilar picture (Figure 4.1): in general, Belgian parties are more xenophobic than Swedish parties are. Sweden registered a xenophobic peak in 2006, when almost all parties registered a higher index, while Belgian parties, despite Flemish parties and the National Front, seem to have softened their position against immigrants during the last ten years.

Figure 4.1 - Anti-immigration policy index: Belgium and Sweden



Note: High immigration countries and high levels of MIPEX

[13] Question wording: "Immigration: Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into society. (1) … Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return to their country of origin. (20)"

[14] Question wording: "Position on immigration policy: 0 = strongly opposes tough policy … 10 strongly favours tough policy".

Proceeding with *high immigration countries*, but switching to countries with an *intermediate level of MIPEX*, we can compare the evolution of political parties' orientation toward immigration in six countries: Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and United Kingdom (Figure 4.2). Leftist, greens and liberal parties in Germany along with British Labour, liberals and greens, show a lower level of anti-immigration attitudes. In both countries, the most important parties (Conservatives and Labours in UK, SPD, CSU and FDP in Germany) registered an anti-immigration peak in 2006.

Italy and Spain did not generally confirm the 2006 peak: on the contrary, during the last decade, they saw a little decline in their anti-immigration policy orientations, apart from the Italian regionalist party, *Lega Nord*, which became even more xenophobic than the past.

Finally, Ireland registered a quite different trend, with a general and considerable reduction in anti-immigration policy index in 2006, while data for Luxembourg do not allow us to investigate the behaviour of its parties in the last decade since it is analysed only in the 2002 Benoit and Laver's expert survey.

Figure 4.2 - Anti-immigration policy index: Germany, UK, Italy, Spain, Ireland and Luxembourg



Note: High immigration countries and intermediate levels of MIPEX

The last group of *high immigration* countries consists of countries with a *low level of MIPEX*: Austria and Cyprus (Figure 4.3). While for Cyprus data are only available for 2002, Austrian parties present a general increase, from 2002 to 2010, in the anti-immigration policy index. With the sole exception of the Green party, that nevertheless shows very low xenophobic levels, all parties for which data are available illustrate

an increase in our index from 2002 to 2010, with the highest peak reached by the Freedom Party of Austria in 2006.

Figure 4.3 - Anti-immigration policy index: Austria and Cyprus



Note: High immigration countries and low levels of MIPEX

Among ***intermediate immigration countries***, i.e. those countries with a percentage of foreign population from 3.5 to 7 percent, Finland, Netherlands and Portugal are also classified as having a *high MIPEX Index*. According to Figure 4.4, all Finnish and Portuguese parties, apart from Social-democrats and Christian-democrats in Finland and the Democratic and Social Centre/People's party in Portugal, reduced their respective indexes of anti-immigration policies during the past ten years. On the contrary, the Netherlands saw a general increase in its parties' anti-immigration orientations apart from two parties: Christian Union and Democrats 66.

Figure 4.4 - Anti-immigration policy index: Finland, Netherlands and Portugal





Note: Intermediate immigration countries and high levels of MIPEX

Other four countries present an *intermediate level of immigration* but an *intermediate level of Migration Integration Policy Index*: Denmark, France, Greece and Slovenia (Figure 4.5). Both Denmark and France have three parties with an index of anti-immigration policies greater than 50 points: *Front National*, *Mouvement Pour la France* and *Union pour un Mouvement Populaire* in France and Danish People's Party, Conservative People's Party and Venstre, Liberal Party in Denmark. However, while Danish parties have reduced their anti-immigration attitudes, all the three mentioned French parties have seen their anti-immigration policies orientation increasing in the last decade. That marked difference is generally true for all French and Danish parties for which we have a complete series of data, apart from the Socialist People's Party of Denmark that increased its anti-immigration attitudes. The Greek situation is more similar to the French one: all parties, apart from Communists and *Syriza*, increased their anti-immigration attitudes in the last ten years and two parties, *Laos* and *Pasok*, overcame the 50 point threshold. Finally, in Slovenia only the National Party reaches an index of anti-immigration policies greater than 50 points. Considering data available, we can notice that four parties (NSI, SDS, SLS, SNS) saw their anti-immigration policy index increasing and three (DeSUS, LDS and ZLSD) decreasing.

Figure 4.5 - Anti-immigration policy Index: Denmark, France, Greece and Slovenia





Note: Intermediate immigration countries and intermediate levels of MIPEX

Czech Republic and Malta show a *low MIPEX index* and a *intermediate level of immigration*. Parties of both countries are characterized by very low level of anti-immigration policy index: no one, in fact, is greater than 30 points (Figure 4.6).

Figure 4.6 - Anti-immigration policy index: Czech Republic and Malta



Note: Intermediate immigration countries and low MIPEX

Finally, a number of countries are classified as having a *low level of Migration Integration Policy Index* and of *immigration*: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovak Republic (Figure 4.7). These countries are not comprised in Benoit and Laver expert survey, thus we can observe parties' positions only in 2006 and in 2010. This group of countries can be divided, for analytical purposes, in two sub-groups: on the one hand, countries such as Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania have seen, generally speaking, a reduction in their respective indexes of anti-immigration policies, while countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland passed, from 2006 to 2010, to higher level of the same index. Very few exceptions are present. The Slovak Republic can be placed in an intermediate situation.

Figure 4.7 - Anti-immigration policy index: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovak Republic





Note: Low immigration countries and low MIPEX

4.2 The European parliamentary groups: policy positions and euroscepticism

In this paragraph we look at European party families' position on anti-immigration policies and euroscepticism. National parties can indeed be grouped into European party families according to their membership in one of the main seven European Parliamentary groups.

Figure 4.8 - Anti-immigration policy index: European party families



Source: Own elaboration on Chapel Hill (2006)[15] expert surveys (Q25 and Q26)

[15] We decide to use the 2006 survey because of the wide spectrum of countries covered by the survey and the availability of an aggregate database.

In general, the Party of European Socialists, the European Greens-European Free Alliance group and the European United Left-Nordic Green Left represent the three European parliamentary groups less dispersed around their mean, while the Union for Europe of the Nations and the Independence/Democracy seems to have quite dissimilar position on immigration matters right inside.

Then, using the same source of data, we measure each party position on European integration weighting each party orientation toward the EU on n the salience that experts attributed to that issue salience[16]. After normalization, we obtained an index of euroscepticism for each party on a scale from 0 to 100. Then, we compute the mean for each party family. Again, Figure 4.9, shows the differences between European party families in the levels of dispersion around their means (mean represented by red dots).

Figure 4.9 - Euroscepticism index: European party families



Source: Own elaboration on Chapel Hill (2006) expert surveys (Q1 and Q2)

In general, the Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe proves to be very cohesive in its pro-EU attitudes, like so the Party of European Socialists. Other groups seem to be more eurosceptic and more dispersed around their means. More in details, inside the **PES group** (the Party of European Socialists, Figure 4.10), variability is limited both for anti-immigration policies and euroscepticism. In general, anti-immigration orientations are limited and only Danish Social Democrats show an index of anti-immigration policies greater than 40. The same is true for our index of euroscepticism: the French Socialist Party, with about 33 points, represents the most eurosceptic party, followed by the Estonian and Slovakian Social Democratic Parties.

On the other side of the spectrum, parties grouped into the **European People's Party – European Democrats** (EPP-ED, Figure 4.11) show a greater variability going from parties not interested at all in immigration issues, such as the Polish People's Party, to parties favouring very tough immigration policies, such as German CSU and Austrian People's Party. Our Eurosceptism index, on the contrary, shows a quite

[16] Since the original scale ranges from 1 (strongly opposed to European integration) to 7 (strongly in favour of European integration), we reverse the scale.

homogeneous parliamentary group, apart from mainly three cases: Czech Civic Democratic Party, UK Conservatives and Slovak Christian Democrats.

Figure 4.10 - Anti-immigration policy and Euroscepticism indexes: Party of European Socialists



Source: Own elaboration on Chapel Hill (2006) expert surveys

Figure 4.11 - Anti-immigration policy and Euroscepticism indexes: European People's Party – European Democrats



Source: Own elaboration on Chapel Hill (2006) expert surveys

According to our euroscepticism index, parties grouping into the **Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe** (ALDE, Figure 4.12) show very similar positions in favour of the EU. The same is not true for anti-immigration policies: Danish and Dutch Liberals, in fact, demonstrate stronger preferences in favour of anti-immigration policies. However, while variability is high, the mean index of anti-immigration policies is located in an intermediate position between PES and EPP-ED.

Figure 4.12 - Anti-immigration policy and Euroscepticism indexes: Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe



Source: Own elaboration on Chapel Hill (2006) expert surveys

The European party families which present the most homogeneous sets of party positions on immigration issues are left-wing parties and greens parties. In those cases, in fact, variability inside each group is very limited and parties are against anti-immigration policies. The main exception in the **European Greens-European Free Alliance (EFA) group** (Figure 4.13) is represented by the Spanish traditional nationalist minorities' parties (Aragonese Council, Basque Solidarity and Republican Left of Catalonia) and by the Dutch Socialist Party and the Spanish *Izquierda Unida* in the **European United Left (GUE)-Nordic Green Left (NGL) group** (Figure 4.14). However, while the two groups show about the same (low) level of anti-immigration orientations, greens exhibit a much lower level of euroscepticism (notwithstanding Swedish and Irish greens' euroscepticism). In fact, about one third of the leftist parties, led by Dutch and Greek, show a Euroscepticism index above 50 points.

Figure 4.13 - Anti-immigration policy and Euroscepticism indexes: European Greens – European Free Alliance



Source: Own elaboration on Chapel Hill (2006) expert surveys

Figure 4.14 - Anti-immigration policy and Euroscepticism indexes: European United Left – Nordic Green Left



Source: Own elaboration on Chapel Hill (2006) expert surveys

On the other hand, right-wing parties which are grouped into the **Union for Europe of the Nations** (**UEN)** (Figure 4.15) present very high indexes of anti-immigration policies. Exceptions regard Lithuanian and Polish right parties which give scarce importance to immigration issues due to the low level of immigrants in their countries. The euroscepticism index follows more or less the same pattern (notice the Italian *Lega Nord*, as opposed to immigrant as to the EU).

Figure 4.15 - Anti-immigration policy and Euroscepticism indexes: Union for Europe of the Nations



Source: Own elaboration on Chapel Hill (2006) expert surveys

Finally, three of the four parties rallied into the **Independence/Democracy group** (Figure 4.16) present very high levels of anti-immigration attitudes and euroscepticism.

Overall, while some European party families are more homogeneous than others regarding anti-immigration policies (e.g. Greens-EFA, GUE-NGL) and euroscepticism (PES and ALDE), some countries represent better than others that attitude. On the whole, Danish, Austrian, Dutch, German, and British parties present, in general, more anti-immigration policy attitudes than other national parties in the same European parliamentary group, while British, Czech, French and Polish parties are, in general, more eurosceptic.

Figure 4.16 - Anti-immigration policy and Euroscepticism indexes, Independence/Democracy



Source: Own elaboration on Chapel Hill (2006) expert surveys

4.3 Parties, immigration and Euroscepticism

Before studying the politicization of immigration at the micro-level, we end this section by giving a closer look to the relationship between anti-immigration attitudes and euroscepticism at the European party family level. As Figure 4.17 shows, there seems to be a positive and strong relationship between our anti-immigration policy index and euroscepticism. However, a closer look reveals that this relationship is mainly driven by three groups of countries: one group is represented by the dense cloud in the bottom-left, which consist of parties with low level of both euroscepticism and anti-immigration attitudes; a second group is represented by parties with a general high level of xenophobic orientations, but an inconsistent level of euroscepticism; a third group, even if less numerous, consists of parties with low anti-immigration attitudes, but with non-homogeneous levels of euroscepticism.

Figure 4.17 - Parties, immigration and Euroscepticism



Source: Own elaboration on Chapel Hill (2006) expert surveys

Figure 4.18 - Parties, immigration and Euroscepticism by European Parliamentary groups



Source: Own elaboration on Chapel Hill (2006) expert surveys

In fact, controlling for European Parliamentary groups (Figure 4.18), it appears evident that the relationship is mainly driven by two exiguous groups: Independence/Democracy and Union for Europe of the Nations. Other, more numerous, European Parliamentary groups show a very mild positive relationship (ALDE, EPP-ED) or no relationship at all (Greens-EFA and PES). In an intermediate position we can find the European United Left – Nordic Green Left, whose main bulk of national parties is characterized by low anti-immigration orientations and low euroscepticism, but that includes also a number of parties with high xenophobic and/or eurosceptic attitudes.

5. MICRO-LEVEL DATA: EUROPEAN CITIZENS' ORIENTATIONS

In this section we look at citizens' orientations towards immigration, what we refer to as 'micro' level. We know that anti-immigration attitudes may be influenced by several socio-demographic determinants (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). More interestingly, however, these attitudes have usually been found to be connected to economic interest or to national identity values. Studies report that anti-immigrants attitudes arise when immigrants are perceived as a threat to the economic interest of individuals, as a threat to the cultural integrity of the country or by both (Citrin et al, 1997; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Lahav, 2004). In addition to this, also context factors are thought to be crucial in determining anti-immigration attitudes. The characteristics of the national context are indeed likely to influence the way individual characteristics affect attitudes towards immigration. In order to inform our normative discussion in the final section of the paper, we want to look at specific aspects of the current national context to see if and how these are related to anti-immigrants perceptions. At this point in time, we are particularly concerned that anti-immigration attitudes could be positively influenced by the economic and cultural aspect of the economic and financial crisis, that has been affecting European countries since the end of 2008. We are therefore interested to look at how, with the deepening of the crisis, the increasing levels of unemployment and of politicization of the anti-immigration topic in xenophobic terms by the national political offer might have affected anti-immigration attitudes.

In the following paragraphs, we proceed as follow. First, using EB data, we look at the evolution over time of the perception of immigration as one of the most important problems that the country has to face in a specific point in time. Then, using ESS data, we look at the evolution of the importance of determinants of anti-immigration attitudes. In order to perform and inform this analysis, we present some descriptive data first and we construct two anti-immigration index. Afterwards, we investigate the association between some context level characteristics and the relationship between micro-level determinants and attitudes towards immigration. We do this by disaggregating the second index and looking at some different dimensions of anti-immigration attitudes: the economic and national identity/cultural one. Using anti-immigration attitudes as dependent variable, in the former case, we look at the interaction between satisfaction with the economy and a) unemployment rate and b) xenophobic index (as constructed in previous sections). In the latter case, we look at the interaction between ideological self-positioning and xenophobic orientations of the national political offer in determining anti-immigration attitudes. Finally, in time of economic crisis, and given that Euroscepticism is rising in many European countries, also in those that have always traditionally been predominantly pro-Europe (e.g. Southern European countries), we want to study whether and to what extent, feelings of anti-immigration help to feed Eurosceptic orientations. Although this relationship may not have been very strong in the past, we believe it is interesting to look at whether this is still the case or whether this relationship has become relevant now that European integration is politicised more than ever.

5.1 Is immigration perceived as one of the most important problems?

Since 2003 Eurobarometer (EB) surveys asked respondents twice a year to rank the two most important problems facing their country at that moment. By selecting the percentage of respondents listing immigration as one of the most important issue for their country, we are able to look at average (aggregate) trends over time[17]. Figure 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 show these trends for countries with different levels of *foreign population* (EU and extra-EU. Oecd data): high immigration countries (at least 7% of foreign population), intermediate immigration countries (at least 3.5% of foreign population) and low immigration countries (less than 3.5% foreign population).

Figure 5.1 - Immigration perceived as national problem – High immigration countries (at least 7% foreign population)



Source: Eurobarometer

Figure 5.1 shows that among the countries with a *high level* of immigration (at least 7% of the population) Great Britain has the highest percentage of immigration as country problem. The peak of this trend is reached in 2005-2006 (reaching 40% of respondents), 2009 (30%) and 2012-13 (30%). Respondents of other countries claim that immigration is one of the two most important problems in lower percentages, ranging from 5 to 25%, whit the exception of Spain, that presents a very high peak in 2005-2007 (almost 65%) that however dropped to very low levels afterwards. Other countries have different levels of respondents that claim immigration is one of the most important problem of the country, but in almost all countries there is a higher peak in 2006-2007, just right before the Eurozone crisis and then in 2010-2011, in the middle of

[17] Question wording: "What do you think are the most important issues facing (our country) in the moment? (max 2 answers)". Besides immigration, issues included in the list were: Crime, Public Transport (up to EB 65.3), Economic Situation (TCC: ... in our Community), Rising prices / inflation, Taxation, Unemployment, Terrorism, Defense / foreign affairs (up to EB ...) (TCC: Cyprus issue), Housing, Health care system (EB 77.3: Health and social security), The educational system, Pensions, Protecting the environment (EB 72.4: The environment), Energy related issues (energy prices, energy shortages, etc.) (starting with Eurobarometer 65.3), The environment, climate and energy issues (starting with EB 77.3), Government debt (EB 77.3), Others.

the Eurozone crisis. Ireland seems to be the country with high immigration levels with the lowest percentage of people claiming immigration as the most important national problem over the last decade.

Figure 5.2 – Immigration perceived as national problem – Intermediate immigration countries (at least 3.5% foreign population)



Note: * Malta is included as intermediate immigration country instead of low immigration country because it is a transition country for immigration and it is therefore likely to be more similar in terms of immigration attitudes to intermediate or high immigration countries.
Source: Eurobarometer

Figure 5.3 - Immigration perceived as national problem – Low immigration countries (Lower than 3.5% foreign population)



Note: Estonia and Latvia are considered here as low immigration country, since the high % of immigration seen in Figure 2 and 3 are not due to genuine immigration but to the high number of 'recognized non-citizens', mainly former Soviet Union citizens, who are permanently resident in these countries but have not acquired Latvian/Estonian citizenship or any other citizenship.
Source: Eurobarometer

Among countries with an *intermediate level* of immigration (Figure 6), we find slightly lower percentages of people claiming immigration as one of the two most important national issue, ranging from 0 or less than 5% over the whole decade of Portugal and Slovenia to 17-18% of the Netherlands and Finland. Higher peak are reached by Denmark in 2005-2006 (about 30%) and by Malta, a transition country for immigration, where there are a lot of fluctuations in terms of perceptions of immigration as a problem but with a range that goes from 15 to 50%. The highest peaks of perception of immigration as a problem are reached in 2008-2009 with 50%, in 2011 with 40% and in 2013 with 30%.

Among countries with a *low level* of immigration (Figure 7), the percentage of respondents for each country claiming that immigration is one of the most important problems for their country is much lower than higher immigration level countries, ranging from 0 to 12%. The countries that have higher percentages are Latvia and Lithuania that both reach peaks of about 10% in 2006, 2010, and 2013.

Perceptions of "immigration as a problem" seem therefore to be highly related to the percentage level of immigrants in the country. This relation, however, needs not to be overstated since other factors such as integration issues and the immigrant position of the political offer are thought to be very important in politicizing and affecting these public opinion trends. Moreover, even in high immigration countries, the percentages of real immigration flows tend to be overestimated by the population (Sides and Citrin, 2007). This would imply that correct factual information might mitigate the sense of immigrants as perceived threat (Gilens, 2001).

5.2 Orientations towards immigration in the EU

When studying more in details orientations towards immigration in the EU, we use data from the European Social Survey. No data exists for 1999, so we look at surveys run in 2002, 2008, and 2012. Two sets of items measuring opposition to immigration are retaken in the three ESS rounds. We call them set A and set B, and we initially use both for descriptive purposes (see Table 6.1). Set A asks whether respondents prefer to grant access to the country to many or few immigrants. The first two questions measure whether people believe their country should allow people of the same or of a different ethnic group to immigrate in their country. The third item specifically ask whether respondents believe their country should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe to immigrate in their country. The response value categories are measured on a four-point scale, ranging from 1 (allow many) to 4 (allow none). In set B, each of the tree items asks how respondents evaluate the consequences of immigration in terms of economic and cultural threat of the native population. Respondents indicated their responses on eleven-point scales, ranging from 0 (bad/threat) to 10 (good/no threat). Thus, in both cases higher scores indicate stronger opposition to immigration to the country. These items can be seen as general indicators of a **negative attitude towards immigration** (set A) and **towards its consequences** (set B).

Table 6.1 - The immigration items in the ESS

Variable name	***Question***
Set A	Introduction to the questions: 'Now some questions about people from other countries coming to live in (country).'
imsmetn	To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the **same** race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here?
imdfetn	How about people of a **different** race or ethnic group from most [country] people?
impcntr	How about people from the **poorer** countries outside Europe?
Value categories	1 = Allow many to come and live here, 2 = Allow some, 3 = Allow a few, 4 = Allow none
Set B	
imbgeco	Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s **economy** that people come to live here from other countries?
imueclt	Would you say that [country]'s **cultural life** is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?
imwbcnt	Is [country] made a **worse or a better place to live** by people coming to live here from other countries?
Value categories	0= bad for the economy 10= good for the economy; 0= cultural life undermined 10= cultural life enriched; 0= worse place to live 10=better place to live;

Source: ESS

In this study, we focus on anti-immigration attitudes among non-immigrants, namely among citizens that represent the majority of the country[18]. Since factor analysis confirmed that the three items have only one

[18] The presence of immigrants or ethnic minority group members (who are likely to have very different views on immigration) in the sample could distort the results. To avoid this, we remove all respondents of foreign nationality or who belong to an ethnic minority group. Also, when dealing with set A, we exclude respondents with missing values for at least one of the three anti-

underlying factor in each of the set, we can construct two scales to study the evolution of anti-immigration attitudes among European populations. We make the sum of the three anti-immigration items and obtain a scale with higher scores indicating more negative attitudes towards immigration. In order to compare the two different scales we standardize them on a scale from 0 (inexistent anti-immigration attitudes) to 1 (maximum anti-immigration attitudes).

Figure 5.4 shows that index are similar although they present some differences, since they capture different aspects of anti-immigration index. What we can see is that, when looking at the first index (A – negative attitudes towards *immigration*), Cyprus (a country with high levels of foreign population), Portugal and Greece (countries with intermediate levels of foreign population) are the countries with more anti-immigrants attitudes, while Sweden (a country with high levels of foreign population, but also with high Mipex index) is by far the country with lowest anti-immigrants attitudes. When looking at the second index (B – negative attitudes towards *immigration consequences*), Sweden is still the country with the least anti-immigrant attitudes (although they are slightly higher than index A) and the level of anti-immigration is similar in Luxembourg, Finland, and Poland after 2002. Looking at index A (negative attitudes towards *immigration*) we can see that from 2008 to 2012, anti-immigration attitudes have *increased* in all countries, with the exception of Germany, Denmark, Spain, France and Slovenia (all countries with an intermediate Mipex integration level), where anti-immigration attitudes have *decreased*. Looking at index B (negative attitudes towards *immigration consequences*), we see that also in Great Britain, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland and Sweden anti-immigration attitudes have been decreasing.

Having had a first overview on how attitudes are distributed across countries and evolved over time, for the next analyses we proceed as follow. Since index A seems to capture a more homogenous aspect of anti-immigration attitudes, we use it for running regressions models and studying the evolution of *determinants* of anti-immigration over time. Index B, instead, is re-separated in its original questions and we use two separate questions to investigate the economic and cultural dimensions of the *perceived consequences of immigration*, by looking at their relationship with contextual level characteristics.

immigration items of set A, and the same procedure is carried out for set B. List-wise deletion was used since there was only a small amount of missing values.

Figure 5.4 - Means of Orientation towards Immigration. ESS (set A and set B). Standardized scale.



Source: ESS. Wave 1 (2002), 4 (2008), 6 (2012)

5.3 Micro-level determinants of orientations towards immigration

Using index A, we first want to look at what are the determinants of anti-immigration orientations across countries and how these have changed over the last decade. In order to do this, we run a linear regression model in each country included in the dataset and for each year for which these data are available.

Our main dependent variable is the anti-immigration index that we constructed above (Index A: 0-no anti-immigration attitudes; 10-strong anti-immigration attitudes). Our first main independent variable deals with material and economic interests of respondents. We first look at how *satisfaction for the economy* at the national level affects orientations towards immigration. This variable is measured in the ESS with the following question: "On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?". The answer categories range from 0 (extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (extremely satisfied), but we reverse the scale for creating a measure of *economy dissatisfaction* (10=extremely dissatisfied; 0=extremely satisfied). When looking at this variable we also want to control for the individual working situations of respondents. Whether respondents are or not employed at the time of the interview might affect the importance given to perceptions of the economy. In the ESS a battery of 9 categories is used to ask the main activity (occupation) of the last 7 days. We create four dummy variables for the following activities: a) in education/student; b) employed; c) unemployed (looking and not looking for a job); d) other activities (including being retired, permanently sick or disabled, community or military service, housework and looking after children, and other), using the category employed as reference category. We expect that dissatisfaction for the economy contribute positively to anti-immigration feelings because immigrants could be seen as a potential economic threat, most of all to unemployed. Unemployed are indeed more likely to see immigrants as competitors in the job market. This means that the more individuals are dissatisfied

about the economy, the more likely should be to dislike immigrants. Also, if they are unemployed, their anti-immigration attitude would be higher than if they were employed. On the other hand, if respondents are students they should be less likely not only than unemployed but also to currently employed people to dislike immigrants. This should happen because students should be less worried about immigrants taking their job since the majority of extra-EU immigrants are unskilled workers and also because through education citizens learn to be more tolerant.

Our second main independent variable is *political ideology,* used as a proxy to perceive immigrants as a cultural threat. The ESS uses an 11-point left-right (0-10) self-placement scale to measure this concept. We recode the variable in five categories: extreme left (0-1), left (2-3), right (7-8), extreme right (9-10), keeping centre (4-6) as reference category. Taking all the ESS countries together, more than 50% of respondents position themselves in the centre in each of the ESS round, 5 to 6% are extreme left, 14 to 16% are left, 18 to 20% are right and 5 to 6% are extreme right. We expect people that self-position themselves on the "extreme right" and on the "right" to be positively associated to anti-immigrants attitudes, while respondents that self-position themselves on the "extreme left" and on the "left" should be negatively related to it. Although left and right orientations might still include an economic dimension, it is usually assumed that people that self-place themselves on the right side of the political spectrum are more likely to be more attached to values such as traditionalism, authority and nationalism (*tan*), while people that self-place themselves on the left side of the political spectrum are more likely to be more attached to values of tolerance and respect for other cultures (*gal*) (Brug, Fennema and Tillie, 2000; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007).

We control the main independent variables for *education*, measured in education years, since, as noted above, education levels should be inversely related to the perception of immigrants as an economic or cultural threat. Indeed, respondents with higher levels of education will on average have higher salaries and will be less worried about immigrants taking their job. Also, through education, they are more likely to have learnt to respect other cultures and will be less likely to see immigrants as a cultural threat.

Finally, besides controlling for demographic characteristics such as *gender* (1=male) and *age categories* (25-35, 36-60, 60+), we also include two control variables that are usually included in studies of immigration perceptions*: life (dis)satisfaction* (0=extremely satisfied; 10=extremely dissatisfied) and *political interest* (1=not at all interested; 4=very interested). The more individuals are dissatisfied with their life, the more they are likely to have anti-immigrants attitudes. On the contrary, the more they are interested in politics, they less likely they are to dislike immigration.

Table 5.2 - Determinants of Anti-immigration Orientations – 2002 (Index A) – See Appendix I
Table 5.3 - Determinants of Anti-immigration Orientations – 2008 (Index A) – See Appendix I
Table 5.4 - Determinants of Anti-immigration Orientations – 2012 (Index A) – See Appendix I

Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 show that in the majority of the country and points in time we find that determinants of anti-immigration attitudes are (significantly) going in the expected direction. However, there are a few exceptions to them. Thus:

- *Dissatisfaction with the economy* feeds anti-immigration attitudes. However, this is not true (regression coefficients are not significant) in:
    - Austria and Spain in 2002;
    - Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland and Portugal in 2008;
- *Self-positioning on the **left** of the left-right scale* is likely to decrease anti-immigrants attitudes with the following exceptions, for which coefficients are not significant:

    - 2002: Czech Republic, Finland, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovenia– not significant coefficients. Hungary and Ireland – significant but positive coefficient;
    - 2008: Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia– not significant coefficients. Bulgaria and Czech Republic – significant but positive coefficient;
    - 2012: Hungary and Poland– not significant coefficients. Bulgaria, Cyprus and Chzech Republic– significant but positive coefficient.
- *Self-positioning on the **right** of the left-right scale* is likely to increase anti-immigrants attitudes with the following exceptions, for which coefficients are not significant:
    - 2002: Austria, Czech Republic, Greece and Poland;
    - 2008: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal and Slovenia;
    - 2012: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
- *Education* decreases anti-immigrant attitudes with the following exceptions, for which coefficients are not significant:
    - 2008: Cyprus
    - 2012: Czech Republic

However, as we can see from tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 the size of individual regression coefficients is not huge and each of the determinants selected in the models only relatively minimally affects a change towards more or less anti-immigration attitudes. This is true over time, since the importance of the determinants of anti-immigration attitudes remains similar or changes in not predictable patterns. Although dissatisfaction with the economy has only few exceptions in statistically significantly predicting higher levels of anti-immigration attitudes, we can see that ideological self-positioning and respondents' education levels seem to be more important determinants of anti-immigration attitudes. This is a first suggestion that, even in times of economic crisis, anti-immigration attitudes seems to be originated more from a cultural discomfort rather than from an economic one.

5.4 Economic vs. Cultural Threat and National Context characteristics

In order to analyse anti-immigration attitudes more in details, we now use Index B (perception of immigration consequences), that allow us to distinguish between two different dimensions, the economic and cultural/national identity. We re-run the regression models by selecting only a specific dimension as dependent variable at a time. In the former case, we use the measure of economic threat (Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s **economy** that people come to live here from other countries?) as dependent variable. Since we expect that anti-immigration attitudes could be influenced, together with individual determinants, by national context characteristics, we look at the relation between micro and macro determinants of anti-immigration attitudes. In the latter case, we use instead the measure of cultural threat (Would you say that [country]'s **cultural life** is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?). As for the main independent variables, in the former case, we use dissatisfaction with the economy, while in the latter case we use ideological self-placement, this time using only three categories (recoding ideological self-positioning values from 0 to 3 as "left", from 4 to 6 as "centre" and from 7 to 10 as "right", and using centre as reference category). The expectations are as above: the more dissatisfied a respondent is with the economy, the more likely he is to perceive immigrants as an *economic* threat. If people position themselves on the right they are more likely to have a positive relationship with perception of immigrants as a *cultural* threat, while if they position themselves on the left they are more likely to have a negative relationship with the dependent variable.

Given that we are also interested in capturing national characteristics and in how these affect the individual level relationship between the main independent variable and the specific dimension of anti-immigration attitudes, we use a two-stage regression. This method allows us to understand what happens both at the

micro level (the individual level), looking at the level-1 coefficients and how they vary by country, and at the macro level (the country level), looking at the level-2 coefficients that describe variation between countries. The first step of this analysis is to fit the regression model between the main independent variable and the dependent variable (anti-immigration attitudes) at level-1 for each country separately. Then, coefficients of the main independent variable of each regression (one coefficient for country) are saved. In order to control for error of predictions and to make these coefficients more comparable across countries we divide them by their standard error. In this way we avoid to give excessive weight in level-2 analysis to Bs that have high standard errors. The second step of the analysis usually consists in estimating level-2 effects by running regressions on the country-level regression, using the coefficients of level-1 regressions as dependent variables and country characteristics as independent variables. Having fit the models separately at level-1, we are automatically allowing slopes as well as intercepts to vary by country, in a similar way to multi-level regression. However, since we are dealing with only a limited amount of cases at level-2 (about 20), in order to avoid drawing wrong conclusions from the model, in our study we only make a visual descriptive analysis at level-2. We therefore plot a graph with the level-1 regression coefficients on the y-axis and the country characteristics we are looking at on the x-axis. This gives us enough information to be able to judge whether an association between level-1 and level-2 is likely. We run two-steps regression for 2008 (before the crisis) and 2012 (after the crisis) in order to see whether the economic crisis that affected Europe starting from late 2008 had an effect in changing the relationship between the micro and the macro level characteristics, for each of the two dimensions.

We look at the relationship between level-1 and the following level-2 characteristics: a) unemployment rate (Eurostat. Only used for the economic dimension), and b) national anti-immigration policy index (CHES expert surveys)[19]. The first is an economic indicator, while the second is more of a cultural, national identity indicator. With the economic crisis unemployment has increased in all countries, except for Germany where unemployment has even decreased. Not only this. As our anti-immigration policy index indicates, the crisis has also led to an increase of the xenophobic political offer at national levels in the majority of the countries in Europe that we are considering. The only exceptions are Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, Hungary, Belgium and Denmark, where, in general, the xenophobic political offer seem to have decreased from 2008 to 2012.

[19] Described above.

Figure 5.5 - Relationship between level-1 coefficients of dissatisfaction with the economy influencing perception of immigration as an *economic* threat and *unemployment* rate



Source: Unemployment rate 8Eurostat) and ESS

Starting with the *economic* dimension, level-1 coefficients correspond to regression coefficient of dissatisfaction with the economy influencing perception of immigrants as an *economic* threat, controlling for all other variables in the model, divided by their standard error. Micro-macro relations between level-1 coefficients and level-2 country characteristics are presented in Figure 5.5 and 5.6.

From Figure 5.5 it seems that higher unemployment rates are associated to a weaker relationship between dissatisfaction with the economy and anti-immigration feelings in 2008 and even more in 2012. However, if we look at how individual countries moved in terms of relationship between dissatisfaction with the economy and anti-immigration from 2008 to 2012, we see that with the exception of the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Sweden and Great Britain, in which the coefficients of level-1 has decreased from 2008 to 2012, and with the exception of Germany, in which coefficients has remained stable, in all other countries the level-1 coefficients increased. **This means that**, **with the worsening of the crisis, in the majority of countries dissatisfaction with the economic situation increases perceptions of immigrants as an economic threat. However, the overall micro-macro relationship, with due exceptions, tends to be lower in countries with more unemployment.** This suggests that either poorer countries are more sympathetic with immigration processes in terms of economic perceptions, or that this relationship is influenced (also) by some other macro level characteristic**.**

Figure 5.6 - Relationship between level-1 coefficients of dissatisfaction with the economy influencing perception of immigration as an *economic* threat and national *anti-immigration policy index*



Source: Anti-immigration policy index (CHES) and ESS

In this respect, we see that Figure 5.6 shows that **higher levels of national xenophobic political offer corresponds to higher levels of association between dissatisfaction for the economy and the perception of immigrants as economic threat. On the whole, this relationship gets stronger as the national xenophobic political offer increase with the economic crisis.** In this sense, we could assume that for Sweden and Great Britain the decrease in the level-1 coefficients, has been due to the decrease from 2008 to 2012 of the national xenophobic index. However, we are not able to identify the possible causes of this decrease for Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Slovenia, where the xenophobic index has actually increased with the economic crisis, and the increase in unemployment has been considerable. In the same way, the increase of level-1 coefficients in Hungary, Belgium and Denmark cannot be attributed to changes in the national xenophobic index, since in these countries xenophobic political offer has decreased. Yet, we can see that both Hungary and Denmark has had a sharp increase in unemployment rate from 2008 to 2012, while Belgium has had a considerable increase in extra-EU immigration levels.

Looking now at the *cultural* dimension (Figure 6.7), we first look at the change of coefficients at level-1. Level-1 coefficients correspond in this case to the regression coefficients of ideological (left-right) self-positioning influencing perception of immigrants as a *cultural* threat, controlling for all other variables in the model, divided by their standard error. We then study the relationship between level-1 and xenophobic index, the level-2 characteristic of our interest. As expected, in the majority of the countries, self-positioning themselves on the left of the ideological scale (compared to self-position in the centre) corresponds to a negative coefficient, while self-positioning themselves on the right corresponds to positive coefficients. This means that respondents that self-position themselves on the left of the scale

tend to reject the view of immigrants as a cultural threat, while those that self-position on the right tend to accept it.

Figure 5.7 indicates that the higher the xenophobic index in the country, the higher the politicization of the perception of immigrants as a cultural threat: the level-1 coefficients become increasingly negative when respondents position on the left and increasingly positive when they position on the right of the ideological scale. Moving from 2008 to 2012, the coefficients at level-1 concerning left-right self-positioning seems to radicalize. Self-positioning on the left of the left-right scale corresponds to stronger opposition towards immigration as a cultural threat, while self-positioning on the right of the left-right scale corresponds to stronger agreement with the statement that immigration are perceived as a cultural threat. This is however not always true. Not only in Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary a left position (compared to a centre position) increases the chances of perceiving immigrants as a cultural threat, but this relationship gets even stronger in 2012. Moreover, in Czech Republic and Bulgaria in 2008 (coefficients of Poland and Portugal are only very slightly negative in 2008) and in Bulgaria and Czech Republic in 2012, being on the right of the ideological scale decreases the chances to perceive immigrants as a cultural threat. In Bulgaria this relationship gets even stronger in 2012. Also, the strength of the self-positioning on the right hand of the ideological scale does not change before and after the crisis in countries such as Hungary, and only slightly decrease in Great Britain and the Netherlands.

Figure 5.7 - Relationship between level-1 coefficients of left-right self-positioning influencing perception of immigration as *cultural* threat and national *anti-immigration policy* index



Source: Anti-immigration policy index (CHES) and ESS

On the whole, the analysis of the two different dimensions leads us to confirm the findings of previous sections. Although the two dimensions are intrinsically related, anti-immigration attitudes seem to be caused more by a cultural than an economic problem. It is more how the political discourse on immigration is framed and politicized at the national level in terms of left and right, and of different ideas of society that seems to affect both economic and cultural determinants of anti-immigration attitudes, rather than the real economic conditions of a country. The economic crisis that the Eurozone is currently facing is only amplifying this association.

5.5 - Do anti-immigration attitudes lead to Euroscepticism?

We are now interested in looking at whether a connection between orientations towards immigration and orientations towards the European Union exists. As claimed above, there has never been a strong connection between these two variables at the individual level. However, since with the Eurozone crisis, European Integration-related issues has started to be politicized much more than the past, even in countries in which no strong opposition to the EU ever existed, we want to look at whether this relationship has changed. We wonder whether anti-immigration attitudes feed anti-EU attitudes because the economic crisis may have a) increased negative attitudes towards the European Integration process that allow people to travel freely within the EU and to compete on the same labour market in times of growing national unemployment; b) increased negative attitudes towards people of different cultures, not only coming from outside the European Union but also coming from within the EU.

The ESS does not include a wide range of indicators to measure support or opposition for the EU. However, attitudes towards the EU could be captured by two items. The first item (A) asks to rate on an eleven-point scale the trust that an individual has for one of the most important EU institutions: the EU Parliament. The scale ranges from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust)[20]. In order to make it comparable to orientations towards immigration we reverse the scale, and construct a euroscepticism scale. The second item (B) has been asked only in 2008 and 2012 and measure whether the EU "unification has already gone too far" (10) or whether "unification should go further" (0)[21]. As for orientations towards immigration, also in this case we standardize our measures from 0 to 1. We obtain a measure that gives the highest number (1) when no trust in the EU Parliament exist or when unification has gone too far, and the lowest number (0) when complete trust exist or when respondents think that unification should go further. In Figure 5.8 we present means of euroscepticism on standardized scales as measured by the two items in each country over time.

The two indicators present a similar, although not equal, picture of country-average anti-European attitudes. In figure 5.8.A (Distrust in European Parliament), the highest peak (more than 0.60) of Euroscepticism is held by Great Britain and Portugal, which had a high increase of negative attitudes towards the EU from 2008 to 2012 together with Spain, both countries heavily hit by the Euro zone crisis. Hungary, Slovenia and Czech Republic also have more than 0.60 eurosceptic attitudes in 2012. In all of these countries, trust in the European Parliament has worsened since 2008. An increase of distrust has been also in place in Bulgaria, Poland, Ireland, Netherlands, Cyprus and Greece. In the latter two countries the increase has been particularly strong. Eurosceptic attitudes in Finland, Belgium, Germany, Denmark and France remained almost stable (slight increase of distrust for the first two countries, and slight decrease of distrust in the latter three), together with Sweden that has however much more trust in the EP than 2002.

[20] Question wording: "Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust the European Parliament?". Value categories: 0=No trust at all; 10=Complete trust

[21] Question wording: "Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?". Value categories: 0=unification should go further, 10=unification has already gone too far.

On the other hand, figure 5.8.B (European Unification has already gone too far) shows that Great Britain is the country that think that European Unification has already gone too far, followed by Finland, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden, Czech Republic and Cyprus. One relevant difference from figure A concerns Spain that, although has increasing distrust in the European Parliament, it has increasing propensity to continue European Unification, suggesting that it is the current state of European unification that leads Spaniards to distrust the EP.

Figure 5.8 - Means of Euroscepticism A) Distrust in European Parliament B) European Unification has already gone too far. Standardized scale



Source: ESS 2202, 2008, 2012

Since we are interested in looking at whether attitudes towards immigration affect negative attitudes towards Europe in time of Eurozone economic crisis (started in late 2008), when Europe has become much more politicized compared to the past, we are only interested at looking at this relationship in 2012. Thus, we decide to use the second Euroscepticism item scale (B – European Unification) as dependent variable of our regressions because it is better able to capture orientations towards the EU, rather than to only one of its institutions. Before running regressions, however, we start by exploring the strength of the linear relationship between anti-immigration attitudes and Euroscepticism. We run a correlation between the two scales in each of the country of the ESS dataset for the year 2012.

Table 6.5 reports the results from the pairwise Pearson correlation between anti-immigration and euroscepticism indexes. We can see that although in all of the countries taken into account the relationship is significant, the strength of the linear association is not very big. However, we find different levels of associations in different types of countries. We can see that the highest correlations (ranging from 0.40 to 0.48) are found in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Denmark and Finland. An intermediate level of correlation (ranging from .32 to .37) exists in Spain, United Kingdom, Portugal, Czech Republic, Hungary and

Ireland. And a low level correlation (ranging from .18 to .29) includes countries such as Bulgaria, Poland, Cyprus, Sweden and Slovenia.

Table 5.5 - Correlation between anti-immigration feelings and Euroscepticism in 2012

Higher Correlation		Intermediate Correlation		Lower Correlation	
NL	0.48	***ES***	0.37	***BG***	0.29
BE	0.43	***GB***	0.37	***PL***	0.25
DE	0.43	***PT***	0.37	***CY***	0.21
DK	0.42	***CZ***	0.36	***SE***	0.18
FI	0.40	***HU***	0.33	***SI***	0.18
		IE	0.32		

Note: All Pearson pairwise correlations are significant at the 5% statistical level
Source: ESS data

Figure 5.9 - Regression coefficients for linear association between anti-immigration attitudes and Euroscepticism (2012)



Source: ESS data

We then run a linear regression between the two measures of attitudes, using Euroscepticism as dependent variable and anti-immigration as main independent variable, controlling for dissatisfaction with the economy, activity in the last 7 days, left-right scale, gender, age category, life satisfaction, and political interest. Coefficients for the main relationship under investigation are positive and significant in all countries, although not very strong (between .04 and .16). The relative importance of the strength of the coefficients is shown in Figure 5.9, where level-1 coefficients divided by their standard error are reported. We can see that in Germany, Finland and the Netherlands the relationship between anti-immigration attitudes and Euroscepticism is stronger, while in Cyprus, Slovenia and Poland the relationship is weaker.

In short, we could say that, in general, although the economic crisis has not massively contributed to strengthen the relationship between anti-immigration and Euroscepticism attitudes, we can note that these attitudes are positively correlated and the strength of this relationship is different in different European countries. This means that, under specific conditions, this association could become more relevant and become a further dimension of criticism of the European Union. For instance, in countries in

which some political parties have undertaken in their political standing both anti-immigration and anti-European Union attitudes, these parties might have cued citizens and influenced public debate in such a way that a stronger connection between the two attitudes is created with detrimental effects for the EU.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The conclusion of our study on the public opinion and immigration at the macro, meso and micro level deals with some broad considerations and directions for policy recommendations. Integration is a process that starts on the ground and integration policies should be developed with a genuine bottom-up approach, but coordinated from the top, both at the national and EU level. First of all, the data analysed in our study show that immigration is perceived by citizens of EU countries more as a cultural than an economic threat. Thus, looking to how different policies score in European countries with different MIPEX levels (Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2, and Figure 6.3), we see that not only is it important to improve the economic aspect of immigration (e.g. labour market mobility). It is crucial to develop long-term systematic measures that address not only the cultural understanding of immigrants of the native population, but, even more importantly, measures that address the cultural understanding of immigration by the native population, such as anti-discrimination and educational policies. This would have the aim of increasing tolerance and reciprocal understanding of cultural differences. Besides the importance of launching a large campaign to understand the "others" as well as increasing, coordinating and supporting long-term collaboration between autochthons and foreign population, education should be the keystone in the integration process. Teachers, for instance, should be equipped with skills for managing diversity and teachers with migrant backgrounds should be recruited.

Figure 6.1 - Policy Score for High MIPEX countries



Source: MIPEX
Note: Belgium, Sweden: high immigration; Finland, Netherlands, Portugal: intermediate immigration

Figure 6.2 - Policy Score for Intermediate MIPEX countries



Source: MIPEX
Note: Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, UK: high immigration countries; Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia: intermediate immigration countries.

Figure 6.3 - Policy Score for Low MIPEX countries



Source: MIPEX
Note: Austria, Cyprus: High immigration countries; Czech Republic, Malta*: Intermediate immigration countries; Bulgaria, Estonia**, Hungary, Latvia**, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic: low immigration countries.

At the same time, immigrants should be provided with the proper tool to be able to integrate in society. Family reunions should be facilitated and language courses should be provided at no costs, reflecting migrants varying needs of integration. Introductory programmes for newly arrived immigrants should be organized, including civic and cultural orientation courses, and special attention should be given to specific needs of vulnerable groups of migrants.

If those policies will be correctly framed and carefully implemented, European citizens could become able to see national identity as a more inclusionary and less exclusionary process, thus taking the path of improving policies related to access to nationality of immigrants, one of the main shortcomings of countries with a low MIPEX index. This could facilitate relations and acceptance between locals and foreign population. However, since the access to nationality brings about political rights, this measure must be accompanied by electoral reforms hindering the formation of ethnic minorities' parties, so to avoid the consequent growth of xenophobic party.

Understandably, the cultural transformation demanded to EU citizens takes time and cannot be done once and for all. EU nationals must have the time to adapt to changes. But if this process will be addressed with long-term goals by EU countries together, it will be easier for EU citizens to perceive immigrants as a resource rather than a threat. In this change, mass media and political parties have a fundamental role in changing perceptions of immigration. First of all, since the widespread public tend to overestimate the amount of immigrants present in one's country, politicians and media should provide citizens with correct factual information on real flows and actual national economic consequences of immigrants (contrarily to what the majority of people believe, extra-EU foreign population represents a maximum of 7% of the total population). This can have substantial consequences for their opinions (see for example Gilens, 2001), mitigating the sense of 'threat' that immigrants represent, and waning hostility towards immigrants (Sides & Citrin, 2007).

Also, the notion of nationhood should be redefined to accommodate cultural differences of people coming from outside (but also from within) Europe. We have shown that people's negative attitudes tend to rely more on the cultural dimension, that is likely influenced by culturally symbolic national and international events (e.g. 11 September attacks, the London and Madrid train bombings, etc.) as reported and framed by media and politicians, rather than by real demographic and economic conditions of a country. Thus, political parties, maybe under the umbrella of their European Parliamentary groups, should have a primary role in facilitating a responsible cultural change, in terms of redefinition and enlargement of the "Circle of We" (Hollinger, 2005). In order to prevent populist claims to gain too much attention, xenophobic attitudes by political parties should be sanctioned and reduced in importance in public discourse through a lively debate. This is particularly important, considering that, according to the results of the expert surveys considered, the bulk of parties in the EU are neither xenophobic nor eurosceptic. This lively debate should be carried out both at the local, national and EU level and it should include foreign population groups. Its aim would be to address with factual information an issue that is causing uninformed concerns as well as to redefine cultural and national boundaries, finding acceptable compromises between different and sometimes conflictive ways of life outside (and within) the EU.

APPENDIX

Table 5.2 - Determinants of Anti-immigration Orientations – 2002 (Index A)

	AT	BE	CZ	DE	DK	ES	FI	FR	GB	GR	HU	IE	LU	NL	PL	PT	SE	SI
Satisfaction	0.00886	**0.0978*** **	**0.0883** **	**0.134*** **	**0.130*** **	-0.0360	**0.0811*** **	**0.137*** **	**0.177*** **	**0.0776*** **	**0.112*** **	**0.0824*** **	0.0243	**0.0908*** **	**0.0617** **	**0.0834** **	**0.0891*** **	**0.116*** **
Economy	(0.0261)	(0.0304)	(0.0352)	(0.0202)	(0.0292)	(0.0388)	(0.0256)	(0.0300)	(0.0259)	(0.0207)	(0.0302)	(0.0244)	(0.0535)	(0.0244)	(0.0270)	(0.0412)	(0.0237)	(0.0331)
Job.	**-0.975*** **	**-0.531** **	**-0.608***	**-0.387** **	**-0.554*** **	-0.297	**-0.801*** **	**-0.626*** **	-0.368	**-0.611*** **	**-0.563*** **	**-0.685*** **	-0.354	**-0.536** **	**-0.825*** **	**-0.681** **	-0.144	**-0.548** **
Student	(0.244)	(0.238)	(0.364)	(0.162)	(0.210)	(0.320)	(0.156)	(0.224)	(0.286)	(0.208)	(0.200)	(0.216)	(0.353)	(0.215)	(0.170)	(0.296)	(0.162)	(0.214)
Job.	**-0.536***	-0.0946	-0.348	**0.419** **	0.275	-0.0474	**0.410***	-0.107	-0.436	-0.0139	-0.264	-0.0628	0.924	0.188	**0.286***	-0.276	0.292	0.198
Unemployed	(0.310)	(0.276)	(0.393)	(0.164)	(0.305)	(0.345)	(0.217)	(0.264)	(0.270)	(0.256)	(0.305)	(0.271)	(1.156)	(0.393)	(0.174)	(0.451)	(0.269)	(0.310)
Job.	-0.0248	0.154	**0.414** **	0.0822	0.151	0.0961	0.171	**0.422** **	0.209	0.0629	0.0460	-0.103	-0.269	0.0884	0.127	0.0643	**0.440*** **	0.152
Other	(0.156)	(0.167)	(0.187)	(0.118)	(0.172)	(0.213)	(0.156)	(0.178)	(0.143)	(0.125)	(0.143)	(0.136)	(0.256)	(0.108)	(0.141)	(0.204)	(0.162)	(0.208)
Education	**-0.133*** **	**-0.140*** **	**-0.139*** **	**-0.124*** **	**-0.134*** **	**-0.0448*** **	**-0.118*** **	**-0.109*** **	**-0.159*** **	**-0.0623*** **	**-0.0860*** **	**-0.0833*** **	**-0.107*** **	**-0.0662*** **	**-0.139*** **	**-0.0817*** **	**-0.113*** **	**-0.0781*** **
Years	(0.0186)	(0.0189)	(0.0234)	(0.0135)	(0.0157)	(0.0160)	(0.0135)	(0.0161)	(0.0172)	(0.0119)	(0.0165)	(0.0162)	(0.0290)	(0.0119)	(0.0167)	(0.0193)	(0.0153)	(0.0222)
L-R. Extreme	**-1.248*** **	-0.324	0.0912	**-0.657*** **	**-0.895*** **	**-0.697** **	-0.110	**-1.066*** **	0.296	-0.420	**0.610*** **	**0.829*** **	0.109	**-0.625** **	0.188	**-0.900** **	**-0.488*** **	-0.0288
Left	(0.240)	(0.255)	(0.303)	(0.194)	(0.305)	(0.277)	(0.284)	(0.199)	(0.323)	(0.265)	(0.224)	(0.307)	(0.407)	(0.245)	(0.188)	(0.354)	(0.180)	(0.244)
L-R. Left	**-0.842*** **	**-0.496*** **	-0.0795	**-0.580*** **	**-0.888*** **	**-0.420** **	-0.226	**-0.469*** **	**-0.497*** **	**-0.419** **	**0.383** **	-0.213	-0.390	**-0.570*** **	0.0946	-0.227	**-0.229***	-0.244
	(0.142)	(0.164)	(0.197)	(0.0967)	(0.183)	(0.179)	(0.147)	(0.153)	(0.163)	(0.166)	(0.149)	(0.175)	(0.282)	(0.125)	(0.141)	(0.190)	(0.117)	(0.188)
L-R. Right	0.191	**0.301***	-0.0713	**0.630*** **	**0.351*** **	**0.659*** **	**0.316*** **	0.222	0.207	0.135	0.175	**0.227***	0.206	**0.342*** **	0.162	**0.472** **	0.0366	0.194
	(0.171)	(0.166)	(0.176)	(0.123)	(0.116)	(0.236)	(0.106)	(0.161)	(0.144)	(0.124)	(0.149)	(0.130)	(0.265)	(0.102)	(0.139)	(0.200)	(0.114)	(0.209)
L-R. Extreme	0.118	0.498	-0.146	**1.373*** **	**0.735*** **	0.674	**0.757*** **	**0.588** **	**0.834*** **	0.105	**0.441** **	**0.511** **	**0.932** **	**1.276*** **	0.0469	**1.105*** **	**0.832*** **	**0.648** **
Right	(0.378)	(0.327)	(0.222)	(0.285)	(0.254)	(0.448)	(0.173)	(0.242)	(0.294)	(0.138)	(0.201)	(0.225)	(0.418)	(0.207)	(0.176)	(0.326)	(0.211)	(0.306)
Gender	0.277**	-0.131	0.0951	0.242***	0.352***	-0.0502	0.444***	0.0499	0.0935	-0.0293	-0.0569	0.179*	-0.130	0.153*	0.201**	-0.107	0.337***	0.240*
	(0.109)	(0.119)	(0.137)	(0.0796)	(0.105)	(0.153)	(0.0896)	(0.116)	(0.107)	(0.0978)	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.199)	(0.0892)	(0.102)	(0.149)	(0.0910)	(0.132)
Age. 36-60	0.294**	0.161	0.163	0.223**	0.121	0.0435	0.458***	0.360**	0.155	-0.148	0.248*	0.0107	0.399	-0.171	0.326***	-0.0186	0.203*	0.274
	(0.136)	(0.139)	(0.186)	(0.108)	(0.132)	(0.194)	(0.119)	(0.146)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.136)	(0.129)	(0.260)	(0.111)	(0.122)	(0.197)	(0.114)	(0.174)
Age. 60+	0.859***	0.257	0.359	0.402***	0.417**	0.251	0.647***	0.407*	0.255	-0.00294	0.210	0.136	0.805**	-0.153	0.623***	-0.318	0.249	0.422
	(0.202)	(0.218)	(0.237)	(0.151)	(0.207)	(0.264)	(0.193)	(0.221)	(0.178)	(0.163)	(0.189)	(0.183)	(0.338)	(0.152)	(0.189)	(0.263)	(0.188)	(0.270)
Satisfaction	-0.0575**	-0.000565	-0.0495	-0.0908***	0.0476	-0.0811**	-0.0470	-0.0427*	-0.0224	-0.0405*	-0.0182	0.0245	-0.0484	-0.121***	-0.0159	-0.0105	-0.0410	-0.0801**
for Life	(0.0277)	(0.0335)	(0.0343)	(0.0189)	(0.0357)	(0.0410)	(0.0292)	(0.0254)	(0.0262)	(0.0209)	(0.0254)	(0.0275)	(0.0555)	(0.0278)	(0.0209)	(0.0367)	(0.0279)	(0.0316)
Political	-0.247***	-0.451***	-0.275***	-0.329***	-0.238***	-0.320***	-0.331***	-0.371***	-0.291***	-0.215***	-0.327***	-0.367***	-0.190*	-0.323***	-0.180***	-0.246***	-0.392***	-0.215***
Interest	(0.0640)	(0.0706)	(0.0948)	(0.0518)	(0.0760)	(0.0913)	(0.0590)	(0.0659)	(0.0629)	(0.0485)	(0.0709)	(0.0583)	(0.108)	(0.0592)	(0.0692)	(0.0837)	(0.0595)	(0.0820)
Constant	10.09***	9.676***	9.243***	8.575***	7.958***	9.070***	8.795***	8.642***	9.227***	9.947***	9.562***	7.658***	9.801***	9.326***	8.146***	9.201***	7.186***	7.937***
	(0.425)	(0.486)	(0.526)	(0.323)	(0.482)	(0.581)	(0.401)	(0.434)	(0.411)	(0.334)	(0.423)	(0.428)	(0.799)	(0.370)	(0.392)	(0.532)	(0.414)	(0.488)
Observations	1,387	1,269	917	2,387	1,210	1,069	1,757	1,143	1,549	1,566	1,076	1,377	588	1,980	1,542	1,003	1,546	895
R-squared	0.175	0.159	0.123	0.191	0.189	0.083	0.195	0.226	0.166	0.105	0.121	0.091	0.089	0.124	0.138	0.092	0.162	0.138

Source: ESS 2002 – wave 1. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table 5.3 - Determinants of Anti-immigration Orientations – 2008 (Index A)

	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	ES	FI	FR	GB	GR	HU	IE	NL	PL	PT	SE	SI
Satisfaction	**0.0881*** **	**0.156*** **	0.0213	**0.0825*** **	**0.136*** **	**0.0699*** **	**0.109*** **	**0.142*** **	0.0214	**0.160*** **	0.0468	**0.0703** **	0.0437	**0.113*** **	**0.130*** **	**0.0914** **	**0.0961*** **	**0.111*** **
Economy	(0.0297)	(0.0505)	(0.0228)	(0.0269)	(0.0207)	(0.0226)	(0.0299)	(0.0250)	(0.0263)	(0.0246)	(0.0292)	(0.0355)	(0.0338)	(0.0293)	(0.0307)	(0.0359)	(0.0221)	(0.0336)
Job.	**-1.175*** **	-0.0391	0.461	**-0.633** **	**-0.494** **	**-0.415** *	**-1.007*** **	**-0.790*** **	**-0.442** **	**-0.945*** **	-0.517	**-0.745*** **	-0.438	-0.245	**-0.529** **	-0.498	**-0.421** **	**-0.316**
Student	(0.216)	(0.487)	(0.469)	(0.257)	(0.193)	(0.213)	(0.237)	(0.156)	(0.199)	(0.250)	(0.350)	(0.242)	(0.274)	(0.246)	(0.209)	(0.319)	(0.185)	(0.244)
Job.	-0.413	-0.228	0.195	0.376	**0.561*** **	0.417	-0.0914	0.0914	0.307	-0.132	-0.307	0.279	0.149	0.124	-0.178	0.449	0.243	**0.888** **
Unemployed	(0.279)	(0.338)	(0.351)	(0.295)	(0.206)	(0.352)	(0.248)	(0.242)	(0.226)	(0.269)	(0.199)	(0.238)	(0.233)	(0.460)	(0.287)	(0.280)	(0.279)	(0.389)
Job.	0.119	**0.540** **	0.142	-0.101	-0.169	0.231	0.295	-0.0254	0.0803	0.169	**0.327** **	-0.194	0.134	**0.249** *	0.262	**0.373** *	-0.0917	0.283
Other	(0.166)	(0.249)	(0.125)	(0.158)	(0.137)	(0.158)	(0.187)	(0.141)	(0.149)	(0.132)	(0.143)	(0.181)	(0.166)	(0.148)	(0.168)	(0.199)	(0.178)	(0.241)
Education	**-0.140*** **	**-0.0896*** **	0.00228	**-0.0780*** **	**-0.154*** **	**-0.0827*** **	**-0.0794*** **	**-0.123*** **	**-0.101*** **	**-0.108*** **	**-0.0599*** **	**-0.0777*** **	**-0.133*** **	**-0.0565*** **	**-0.0633*** **	**-0.0638*** **	**-0.132*** **	**-0.0943*** **
Years	(0.0172)	(0.0269)	(0.0144)	(0.0231)	(0.0148)	(0.0114)	(0.0149)	(0.0118)	(0.0128)	(0.0145)	(0.0158)	(0.0176)	(0.0177)	(0.0132)	(0.0191)	(0.0165)	(0.0148)	(0.0204)
L-R. Extreme	-0.360	**0.629** **	0.205	**0.513** **	-0.188	**-1.382*** **	-0.346	**-1.119*** **	**-1.082*** **	-0.432	**-0.715*** **	-0.216	-0.300	-0.484	**-0.523** *	-0.0402	-0.0597	-0.386
Left	(0.252)	(0.261)	(0.140)	(0.250)	(0.200)	(0.281)	(0.276)	(0.297)	(0.170)	(0.263)	(0.215)	(0.261)	(0.385)	(0.304)	(0.298)	(0.358)	(0.208)	(0.237)
L-R. Left	**-0.316** **	0.180	-0.0724	0.195	**-0.620*** **	**-0.766*** **	**-0.564*** **	**-0.450*** **	**-0.676*** **	**-0.452*** **	**-0.373** **	-0.0935	-0.194	**-0.570*** **	-0.318	-0.156	-0.108	-0.219
	(0.150)	(0.232)	(0.156)	(0.167)	(0.110)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.138)	(0.124)	(0.145)	(0.161)	(0.219)	(0.203)	(0.148)	(0.215)	(0.166)	(0.129)	(0.193)
L-R. Right	**0.442*** **	0.0957	0.00880	0.00891	**0.651*** **	**0.388*** **	0.0610	**0.394*** **	**0.650*** **	0.212	**0.270** *	-0.0731	0.196	**0.353*** **	0.139	0.252	**0.443*** **	0.296
	(0.149)	(0.220)	(0.142)	(0.137)	(0.143)	(0.118)	(0.179)	(0.0974)	(0.122)	(0.139)	(0.145)	(0.162)	(0.173)	(0.126)	(0.148)	(0.179)	(0.113)	(0.214)
L-R. Extreme	**0.777** **	0.0662	-0.131	0.0288	**0.844*** **	**0.858*** **	**1.130*** **	**0.650*** **	**0.740*** **	**1.111*** **	**1.063*** **	-0.161	**0.660** *	**1.243*** **	**0.483** **	-0.0754	**1.388*** **	0.0682
Right	(0.313)	(0.266)	(0.133)	(0.189)	(0.300)	(0.214)	(0.343)	(0.166)	(0.229)	(0.283)	(0.193)	(0.189)	(0.348)	(0.325)	(0.198)	(0.386)	(0.239)	(0.276)
Gender	-0.227**	-0.0718	-0.0116	0.282**	0.207**	0.218**	0.231**	0.518***	-0.0652	-0.0638	-0.159	-0.000528	-0.208	0.323***	0.177	-0.104	0.399***	0.497***
	(0.111)	(0.158)	(0.0972)	(0.111)	(0.0893)	(0.100)	(0.117)	(0.0832)	(0.0906)	(0.0992)	(0.107)	(0.122)	(0.129)	(0.108)	(0.122)	(0.135)	(0.0931)	(0.142)
Age. 36-60	-0.338**	0.225	0.297***	0.185	-0.0284	0.136	0.0670	0.316***	0.168	-0.0864	0.336***	0.114	-0.0958	-0.0247	0.238	0.0770	-0.0220	0.415**
	(0.142)	(0.246)	(0.113)	(0.137)	(0.127)	(0.142)	(0.149)	(0.110)	(0.120)	(0.132)	(0.128)	(0.161)	(0.164)	(0.143)	(0.148)	(0.193)	(0.119)	(0.189)
Age. 60+	0.0410	0.337	0.0623	0.320*	0.433**	0.419**	-0.381*	0.631***	0.748***	0.322*	0.0348	0.435*	0.0624	0.0936	0.495**	0.0264	0.229	0.836***
	(0.202)	(0.314)	(0.159)	(0.192)	(0.179)	(0.193)	(0.230)	(0.169)	(0.186)	(0.172)	(0.191)	(0.224)	(0.218)	(0.191)	(0.223)	(0.253)	(0.188)	(0.293)
Satisfaction	-0.0781**	-0.0730**	-0.0816***	-0.0463	-0.0568***	-0.0886**	-0.0724**	-0.0585**	-0.103***	-0.114***	-0.0509**	-0.0536**	-0.0912***	-0.114***	0.0159	-0.164***	-0.0570**	-0.00730
for Life	(0.0308)	(0.0366)	(0.0264)	(0.0291)	(0.0216)	(0.0364)	(0.0336)	(0.0294)	(0.0204)	(0.0242)	(0.0237)	(0.0264)	(0.0307)	(0.0382)	(0.0292)	(0.0314)	(0.0289)	(0.0367)
Political	-0.397***	0.0975	-0.162***	-0.441***	-0.470***	-0.314***	-0.476***	-0.324***	-0.407***	-0.432***	-0.314***	-0.148**	-0.456***	-0.469***	-0.122	-0.357***	-0.546***	-0.109
Interest	(0.0665)	(0.0943)	(0.0512)	(0.0774)	(0.0598)	(0.0692)	(0.0730)	(0.0555)	(0.0547)	(0.0598)	(0.0588)	(0.0712)	(0.0724)	(0.0726)	(0.0771)	(0.0787)	(0.0624)	(0.0923)
Constant	10.27***	6.051***	8.866***	9.195***	9.286***	8.759***	9.443***	8.575***	9.982***	9.929***	10.16***	9.527***	10.79***	8.787***	5.846***	9.844***	7.641***	6.736***
	(0.473)	(0.690)	(0.380)	(0.464)	(0.352)	(0.454)	(0.458)	(0.393)	(0.362)	(0.382)	(0.411)	(0.484)	(0.519)	(0.471)	(0.490)	(0.467)	(0.409)	(0.598)
Observations	1,466	1,228	876	1,590	2,202	1,394	1,734	1,971	1,667	1,758	1,448	1,070	1,333	1,459	1,232	1,359	1,481	853
R-squared	0.156	0.072	0.044	0.066	0.202	0.191	0.127	0.202	0.244	0.180	0.109	0.066	0.123	0.125	0.084	0.125	0.187	0.140

Source: ESS 2008 – wave 4. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table 5.4 - Determinants of Anti-immigration Orientations – 2012 (Index A)

	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	ES	FI	GB	HU	IE	NL	PL	PT	SE	SI
Satisfaction	**0.125*** **	**-0.0887** **	**0.169*** **	**0.0261**	**0.146*** **	**0.108*** **	**0.0867** **	**0.0851*** **	**0.135*** **	**0.0832*** **	**0.122*** **	**0.160*** **	**0.112*** **	**0.117*** **	**0.0713** **	**-0.0329**
Economy	(0.0284)	(0.0447)	(0.0341)	(0.0271)	(0.0190)	(0.0269)	(0.0342)	(0.0248)	(0.0289)	(0.0301)	(0.0271)	(0.0310)	(0.0279)	(0.0365)	(0.0287)	(0.0417)
Job.	**-0.530** **	-0.190	0.0325	**-0.491** *	**-0.662*** **	**-0.425** **	**-0.751*** **	**-0.539*** **	**-0.804** **	**-1.034*** **	**-0.715*** **	**-0.452** *	**-0.790*** **	**-0.622** *	**-0.343** *	**-0.708** **
Student	(0.208)	(0.586)	(0.344)	(0.268)	(0.153)	(0.186)	(0.266)	(0.166)	(0.314)	(0.263)	(0.238)	(0.267)	(0.227)	(0.350)	(0.192)	(0.295)
Job.	**0.636*** **	0.253	-0.0991	0.332	0.247	0.343	-0.146	-0.134	-0.420	0.259	**0.315** *	-0.176	-0.236	-0.0729	0.299	0.146
Unemployed	(0.236)	(0.311)	(0.234)	(0.309)	(0.199)	(0.273)	(0.205)	(0.173)	(0.269)	(0.256)	(0.189)	(0.300)	(0.240)	(0.213)	(0.252)	(0.321)
Job.	0.245	0.350	**0.360** *	**0.492** **	0.0305	-0.0583	-0.236	0.0269	**0.321** **	-0.157	-0.159	0.201	0.0950	-0.0751	**0.305** *	-0.0724
Other	(0.150)	(0.226)	(0.189)	(0.210)	(0.107)	(0.187)	(0.211)	(0.135)	(0.158)	(0.178)	(0.145)	(0.146)	(0.176)	(0.221)	(0.163)	(0.239)
Education	**-0.0646*** **	**-0.135*** **	**-0.0473*** **	-0.0435	**-0.116*** **	**-0.0394*** **	**-0.108*** **	**-0.103*** **	**-0.116*** **	**-0.0908*** **	**-0.106*** **	**-0.0655*** **	**-0.0961*** **	**-0.0706*** **	**-0.0882*** **	**-0.135*** **
Years	(0.0152)	(0.0262)	(0.0174)	(0.0281)	(0.0122)	(0.0121)	(0.0127)	(0.0109)	(0.0164)	(0.0184)	(0.0174)	(0.0140)	(0.0194)	(0.0168)	(0.0160)	(0.0243)
L-R. Extreme	-0.334	**0.507** **	**0.475** **	**0.784*** **	**-0.329** **	**-1.502*** **	**-0.807*** **	-0.227	-0.287	0.0240	**-0.680** *	**-1.377*** **	-0.285	-0.330	**-1.047*** **	**-0.433** *
Left	(0.261)	(0.250)	(0.193)	(0.228)	(0.154)	(0.241)	(0.209)	(0.255)	(0.273)	(0.286)	(0.365)	(0.261)	(0.264)	(0.283)	(0.236)	(0.258)
L-R. Left	**-0.555*** **	0.152	0.0741	0.00296	**-0.580*** **	**-0.757*** **	**-0.543*** **	**-0.350** **	**-0.547*** **	-0.189	**-0.466*** **	**-1.063*** **	0.146	**-0.685*** **	**-0.972*** **	**-0.765*** **
	(0.146)	(0.265)	(0.227)	(0.187)	(0.0962)	(0.154)	(0.184)	(0.138)	(0.167)	(0.197)	(0.175)	(0.156)	(0.192)	(0.187)	(0.141)	(0.225)
L-R. Right	**0.326** **	0.0223	0.0668	0.142	**0.725*** **	**0.445*** **	**0.617*** **	**0.204** **	**0.343** **	0.0401	**0.541*** **	**0.312** **	0.0209	**0.354** **	0.00312	**0.507** **
	(0.130)	(0.205)	(0.199)	(0.168)	(0.127)	(0.132)	(0.214)	(0.0955)	(0.147)	(0.162)	(0.145)	(0.123)	(0.150)	(0.179)	(0.116)	(0.249)
L-R. Extreme	**0.912*** **	-0.0435	0.308	-0.270	**1.219*** **	**0.721*** **	**0.734** **	0.158	**1.152*** **	0.240	0.0680	**1.126*** **	0.206	0.0325	**0.644*** **	0.354
Right	(0.279)	(0.239)	(0.187)	(0.206)	(0.261)	(0.209)	(0.290)	(0.167)	(0.296)	(0.233)	(0.329)	(0.253)	(0.177)	(0.357)	(0.214)	(0.315)
Gender	0.156	0.247	-0.282**	0.451***	0.191**	0.302***	-0.373***	0.222***	0.147	0.0214	0.132	-0.0806	0.0471	-0.141	0.292***	0.320**
	(0.101)	(0.151)	(0.137)	(0.126)	(0.0777)	(0.110)	(0.133)	(0.0817)	(0.109)	(0.120)	(0.115)	(0.107)	(0.117)	(0.136)	(0.0976)	(0.154)
Age. 36-60	0.317**	0.421*	0.124	-0.0133	-0.0695	0.123	0.00255	0.299***	0.303*	-0.158	0.283*	0.134	0.109	0.137	-0.0520	0.219
	(0.132)	(0.238)	(0.175)	(0.174)	(0.107)	(0.156)	(0.180)	(0.113)	(0.162)	(0.158)	(0.149)	(0.150)	(0.147)	(0.198)	(0.136)	(0.217)
Age. 60+	0.468***	0.452	-0.0820	0.0193	0.173	0.722***	0.549**	0.492***	0.712***	0.341	0.655***	0.115	0.555**	0.0638	-0.0128	0.741**
	(0.181)	(0.291)	(0.244)	(0.248)	(0.138)	(0.215)	(0.258)	(0.155)	(0.204)	(0.220)	(0.193)	(0.189)	(0.217)	(0.267)	(0.188)	(0.305)
Satisfaction	-0.103***	-0.0187	0.0229	-0.0939***	-0.0932***	-0.0502	-0.0416	-0.0653**	-0.0924***	-0.0673**	-0.0872***	-0.129***	-0.0331	-0.111***	-0.0815**	-0.151***
for Life	(0.0319)	(0.0348)	(0.0281)	(0.0319)	(0.0203)	(0.0395)	(0.0306)	(0.0322)	(0.0290)	(0.0289)	(0.0270)	(0.0383)	(0.0280)	(0.0331)	(0.0320)	(0.0386)
Political	-0.522***	-0.311***	-0.326***	-0.539***	-0.376***	-0.273***	-0.437***	-0.478***	-0.304***	-0.243***	-0.495***	-0.462***	-0.0541	-0.378***	-0.360***	-0.366***
Interest	(0.0595)	(0.0900)	(0.0730)	(0.0896)	(0.0517)	(0.0787)	(0.0702)	(0.0555)	(0.0633)	(0.0745)	(0.0622)	(0.0697)	(0.0760)	(0.0757)	(0.0637)	(0.0911)
Constant	8.769***	9.293***	9.438***	9.557***	8.657***	7.360***	9.516***	9.546***	9.247***	10.05***	9.351***	9.512***	6.956***	10.04***	7.548***	10.12***
	(0.438)	(0.639)	(0.519)	(0.527)	(0.326)	(0.502)	(0.511)	(0.403)	(0.443)	(0.430)	(0.459)	(0.480)	(0.469)	(0.506)	(0.448)	(0.688)
Observations	1,521	1,378	718	1,340	2,430	1,176	1,423	1,946	1,541	1,350	1,877	1,546	1,470	1,338	1,472	739
R-squared	0.178	0.060	0.117	0.081	0.185	0.173	0.181	0.157	0.169	0.079	0.130	0.184	0.086	0.097	0.134	0.174

Source: ESS 2012 – wave 6. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

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